

## THE PEACE OF CALLIAS

To Raphael Sealey  
γενέθλια φίλω

LESS than a decade ago Robin Seager wrote<sup>1</sup> that further discussion of the Peace of Callias would be inexcusable. Needless to say, discussion has continued. Wherever one stands, on the problem as such, it ought to be admitted that new ideas have been put forward, or (since it seems unlikely, on a topic so much discussed, that anything new can now be said) at least old and forgotten ones have been revived and put in new perspectives. Meiggs's estimate of a special treatment to be expected every two years has stood up well enough: Klaus Meister's bibliography<sup>2</sup> lists twenty special treatments between 1945 and 1982, and one (by S. Accame) appeared in the same year (1982) as Meister's own.<sup>3</sup>

Statistically, it is clearly time for another paper. But my main excuse is that, as will be known to colleagues in more than one country, I have been putting forward my views on this theme, in various forms and at different levels, ever since I first sketched them in a much wider context at Berkeley in 1975. Now that Meister has kindly referred to one of my principal ideas,<sup>4</sup> discussed with him over dinner when he had long finished his own study, it is time those ideas were set out in formal fashion. That Meister, like Seager, adopted and strongly defended the (nowadays) unconventional view denying the authenticity of the peace<sup>5</sup> at the very time when Accame was no less firmly taking it for granted will in any case show that further discussion may be helpful.

The question of authenticity has in fact dominated debate to excess. That the peace is, in some form, authentic, seems to me to be not too difficult to prove, with a degree of assurance that matches most of what can be established in the history of the fifth century BC (see pp. 10–34); though Meister's arguments on the other side, now the fullest and most concentrated attack on authenticity, will have to be discussed at full length. However, once authenticity is established, it will be seen that this is only the beginning and not the end. For the Peace of Callias is not a mere literary problem, as a survey of most of the discussions might make it appear, but a genuine and important historical problem. The question of how—in what circumstances and in what form—the war begun by Darius and Xerxes came to be finally settled, after at least a generation of intermittent hostilities, and the nature of the relationship between the two great powers of the Aegean area that developed out of the settlement—these are surely among the most important issues that the historian of the fifth century ought to treat. Although the history of the debate necessitates an unreasonable concentration on the preliminary literary problem, I hope, within the inevitable limitations of space available, to make at least a start on the historical aspects of the discussion. In particular, I shall suggest how the peace fits into the development of

<sup>1</sup> LCM iii (1978) 44.

<sup>2</sup> Klaus Meister, *Die Ungeschichtlichkeit des Kalliasfriedens und deren historische Folgen*, Palingenesia xviii (Wiesbaden 1982) 124–30. Works not specifically devoted to this topic but treating it incidentally are listed p. 2 n. 3. His ample references to modern views have dispensed me from collecting them here, which would have doubled the length of this study. My references to modern works are very selective: chiefly to standard works, to points of significance not dealt with in my text, and to works not yet known to Meister.

<sup>3</sup> *Ottava Miscellanea Greca e Romana* (1982) 125–52. Accame has since returned to the subject with an attack on Meister in *Nona Miscellanea* (1984) 1–8.

<sup>4</sup> See especially Meister 5 n. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Meister has collected 162 items referring to the peace, some of them containing more than one entry, down to 1982. Of those, about 26 are of the nineteenth century, 20 between 1901 and 1939, 4 between 1940 and 1945, and the rest since 1945. Of 151 whose opinions he has counted, 114 believe in authenticity and 29 deny it. (The rest express no clear opinion.) Significantly, 15 of those who deny authenticity are among the 26 listed for the nineteenth century, and only 13 of them are among the well over 100 since 1940. In other words: since 1940 nearly all scholars who have written on the peace have regarded it as authentic. In 1953 (printed in *Probleme der Alten Geschichte* [Göttingen 1963] 253) Hans Schaefer could say that 'today, quite rightly, no one presumably doubts its authenticity'.

Athenian politics in the middle of the fifth century, and how the incompatible nature of the political systems of the two contracting powers made the actual process of concluding a peace a far more complex one than is usually recognised, so that its conclusion marks a milestone in the history of both Athenian and Persian diplomacy.

## I

It is at least no longer necessary to argue in full that the accepted date of the peace in the fourth century was straight after the battle of the Eurymedon and as a result of it. This date, which Meiggs still described as one 'with which we need not be seriously concerned', has been shown, especially by Meister, to be at least worth serious concern in any discussion.<sup>6</sup> But although the whole of the evidence need not be presented, it is perhaps worth repeating that the first source suggesting a date is the *Menexenus* (241d f.), certainly written before 380, which puts the peace before the events leading to the battle of Tanagra. Now, the *Menexenus* is of course in part an elaborate joke, and certainly no model of chronological accuracy. But although plain chronological fiction is flaunted in the reader's face, in the basic pretence that the speech was at that point dictated to Socrates by Aspasia, this shows neither a desire to deceive nor chronological ignorance. The actual chronology of events offered by the speech must be taken to be the one that was regarded as canonical at the time when it was written. Soon after, by 380, we have the first detailed reference to some of the terms of the peace, in Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, where, as Meister has stressed, the word *παράγωγιη* (120) seems to take it for granted that the actual terms of the peace, as of the King's Peace, were on public view. Although Isocrates does not imply any particular date, we hear from Plutarch (*Cimon* 13) that the peace was listed in Craterus' collection of Athenian decrees; and since Plutarch explicitly puts it after Eurymedon, it follows that Craterus listed it in the same chronological place. His copy quite possibly gave an archon date in the text (see p. 28 below). As Meister rightly reminds us, the peace was still put in the same chronological context in the fourth century AD, by Ammianus Marcellinus (xvii 11.3).

Since Plutarch does not give an actual archon date, it is unfortunately impossible for us to recover the precise date that fourth-century tradition assigned to the peace. It has long been known that the Athenian embassy led by Callias, which Herodotus (vii 151) reports as visiting Susa 'on other business' (ἑτέρου πρήγματος εἵνεκα) while an Argive embassy was there to ask Artaxerxes I whether he still regarded Argos as a friend, as his father Xerxes had done, must be relevant to the peace named after this Callias; and it is extraordinary that some modern scholars (listed by Meister p. 23 n. 48) have seen no difficulty in using this embassy as evidence for a peace made in or near 449. As Meister says, following earlier scholars, the Argive embassy was apparently on the traditional and necessary mission of securing a new ruler's friendship after his accession. Since the envoys refer only to their friendly relations with Xerxes, it is clear that this is the first Argive embassy to Artaxerxes since Xerxes' death; and in view of the importance that Argos evidently attached to the continuing Persian connection, it is impossible to believe that the city had allowed much time to pass before seeking this reassurance. Any hypothesis that puts this first Argive embassy to Artaxerxes many years after his accession must therefore be discarded: it makes no good sense except soon after Xerxes' death.

Xerxes died about August 465.<sup>7</sup> As nearly always at the death of an Achaemenid King, the

<sup>6</sup> R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 130. It was three years after this that I began to argue the case for acceptance of the fourth-century sources, which I have since done in numerous public lectures and seminars. Acceptance first found its way into print in J. Walsh, 'The authenticity and the dates of the Peace of Callias and the Congress Decree', *Chiron* xi (1981) 31 ff.

Meister's independent and exhaustive discussion in Part i of his study is now, and will remain, definitive.

<sup>7</sup> See R. A. Parker and W. H. Dubberstein, *Babylonian chronology 626 BC-AD 752* (Providence 1956) 17. They report an unpublished eclipse text that dates the murder of Xerxes between August 4 and 8, 465. About the same time, it was reported that in a tablet found at

details of the manner, and the actual date, of his death are obscure, and were no doubt never truthfully published. The successor, Artaxerxes, was (again as usual) insecure on his throne, whenever he in fact gained it and by whatever means. We cannot be sure how long it took him to secure his power, but it cannot have been before the end of (Attic) 465/4.<sup>8</sup> Allowing some time for preparation of an embassy, but taking the Argives' apparent eagerness and anxiety into account, we might postulate the embassy's arrival at Susa late in 464. The very fact that the new King had been insecure might make it politic to appear particularly eager after his victory. As for Callias' contemporaneous embassy, Herodotus' refusal (for whatever reason) to tell us its purpose makes it legitimate to deny (with Meister) that it succeeded in making peace. But one important point must be borne in mind: unless peace had been made before, it must at least have been negotiating about it; for an Athenian embassy had no business at Susa at all (and indeed, no previous one is known) as long as a state of war existed, except, by special arrangement, to try to end that state of war. (Of course, if there was peace already, it might have been there for some consequential task.) The presence of Callias' embassy at Susa, whatever its purpose, soon after Artaxerxes' accession, therefore implies at least peace negotiations, if not an established state of peace.

Whether peace *could* be made under Xerxes is a complex question. It depends, above all, on whether there was time. If the battle of the Eurymedon is put in 467 or before (as it often has been), then there is no doubt about this. If in the summer of 466, when Xerxes had only a year to live, the chronology is tight, but peace was still feasible. For both sides were eager to settle. We are in fact told that Xerxes was eager for peace, and he had reason to be. The battle had shown that resistance to Athenian power was impossible in the foreseeable future, anywhere along the coasts of the eastern Mediterranean. If the King could decently cut his losses, Cyprus and Egypt would at least remain safe from Athenian attacks and political intervention. It seems equally clear that Cimon wanted peace. After the outstanding victory, with the whole of the eastern Mediterranean coastline undefended, he made no move: not the obvious invasion of Cyprus (though Diodorus thinks this took place), nor any move to support rebellion in Egypt. Instead, Cimon now concentrated on Thrace, where Thasos ultimately rebelled. But for that rebellion (which could not be foreseen), Thrace promised more profit at less risk than continued war against the King. As an experienced commander, Cimon must have known the effect of ever-lengthening lines of communication: raids and booty might beckon, but what was won would become increasingly difficult to hold; territorial control was clearly close to its limits, and continued war would only lead to increasing risks for doubtful returns. Cimon was not one to anticipate the error made by his inexperienced opponents in 460. Nor would the prospect that he would go down in history as the man who finally forced the King to concede defeat (for this is how it would be presented) be an unwelcome consideration.

Both parties had good reasons for wanting to settle. Peace should therefore have been easy to conclude, practically on the basis of actual possession, provided certain formal obstacles (to be discussed in detail in our last section) could be overcome. Those obstacles, however, would be well known to all participants. We may regard it as certain that, as soon as peace seemed desirable, the King's advisers would begin to discuss the technicalities and suggest a solution; and

Uruk the scribe still dated by the 21st year of Xerxes in Kislimu (December–January) 465/4; while at distant Elephantine Artaxerxes' accession was known by January 2–3, 464 (see *JNES* xiii [1954] 8 f. and [Elephantine] A. E. Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century BC* [Oxford 1923] no. 6). In response to an enquiry, Professor Stolper has very kindly informed me that the Uruk tablet has been wrongly restored and in fact does not contain the month, only the year. It therefore gives no information on the month of Xerxes' death. He is to publish a corrected version of this text in a forthcoming issue of *JHS*.

<sup>8</sup> A further revolt by an Artabanus in Bactria is reported by Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 14 [35]), certainly before the Egyptian revolt of the late 460s in which Athens ultimately became involved, and so presumably connected with the early accession struggles centred in Artabanus the conspirator: he may have controlled, or been recognised in, some (but not others) of the satrapies. Eusebius (P. 110H) makes Artabanus the sixth Persian King, with a reign of seven months. This can hardly be wholly invented. The Bactrian 'rebel' was most probably a relative who was on his side.

Cimon, who knew the Persians well, must also have been thinking of what would be acceptable to him and to Athens. We must never forget, of course, that the journey from Sardis to Susa along the Royal Road was laid out to take three months (Hdt. v 50), and we must allow precisely this time for an official embassy. That means that Callias' embassy would spend about six months plus a week or two in actual travel. If (as this reconstruction requires) they arrived in winter, the King would at least be available, in Susa or possibly even in Babylon, and could give them a quick audience, if his interests demanded it. Preliminary questions would have been settled by talks at Sardis, the usual centre for negotiations with Greeks, and a few weeks is surely an ample allowance for what had to be done in the King's presence. It is thus perfectly conceivable that peace was made under Xerxes, and it could easily be confirmed in Athens before Xerxes' death was officially known—at whatever time that was, in the second half of 465.

Needless to say, however, if we have to put the battle of the Eurymedon in 465, peace with Xerxes becomes impossible. So, incidentally, do many other events that followed. We cannot here examine the whole of the chronology of one of the most difficult periods of (even) the *Pentecontaetia*, but we must recall one or two of the salient facts. The revolt of Thasos began some considerable time after Eurymedon: not only (as Beloch pointed out) is such a revolt hard to imagine after the most glorious Athenian success since Salamis, until enough time had passed to moderate its impact, but Thucydides' phrase χρόνῳ ὕστερον implies a lengthy interval (cf. i 8.4; iv 81.2): certainly more than a month or two. Hence the revolt of Thasos, which ended τρίτῳ ἔτει (i.e., it lasted over two winters), clearly not later than some time in 463, must have begun in 465; so that Eurymedon cannot be put later than 466. What is the evidence for its date?

This depends on the story of Themistocles' movements. The whole complex has now been analysed by Unz, who is certainly right in insisting (not for the first time) that there is no merit to the view (fashionable among English-speaking scholars in the last two generations or so) that Thucydides related his *Pentecontaetia* in strict chronological order. Indeed, Thucydides himself never tells us so, and the view cannot be maintained without arbitrary emendation and failure to note the difference between his (usual) vague phrases and his precise chronological statements where he happens to be well informed.<sup>9</sup>

Unz rightly insists that the emendation of Naxos to Thasos (based on a manuscript of Plutarch) in i 136.2 is better abandoned. Unfortunately he overlooks the fact that Thucydides has been taken as clearly putting Eurymedon after Naxos: his μετὰ ταῦτα (100.1) has been referred to 98.4, so that Eurymedon seems firmly set between Naxos and Thasos, χρόνῳ ὕστερον. It is surprising that this can simply be ignored in a revision of chronology. Unz, nonchalantly denying that Eurymedon could even be contemporary with Naxos (on which, see further below), simply puts it *before* the revolt, without any comment on Thucydides' precise phrase. He then puts Themistocles' arrival at Ephesus (i 137.2), straight after he had escaped capture by the fleet blockading Naxos, no earlier than September or October of 465, since Thucydides 'implies only a very short interval between Themistocles' arrival in Ephesus and his attempt to contact Artaxerxes', and it would in any case not be safe for him to stay there, since the city was under Athenian control and therefore open to Athenian agents pursuing him. This is better than the recent suggestion that Themistocles could live at Ephesus, inconspicuous and unnoticed, for years;<sup>10</sup> yet it must not be accepted as obvious, without scrutiny.

<sup>9</sup> R. Unz, *CQ* n.s. xxxvi (1986) 68–85. Violent measures have been necessary to maintain the claim of the fundamentalists, most notorious the emendation of a numeral at 103.1, which both removes a sound text in favour of an emendation not easily justified on palaeographical grounds and impairs historical plausibility by separating the capture of Naupactus from the campaigns in central Greece and the *periplous* of Tolmides. The substitution of Thasos for Naxos (see text) is probably a similar case, though here the possibility that Plutarch's text of Thucydides already read 'Thasos' can be claimed to provide some plausibility. Thucydides himself never disguises the nature and limits of his

chronological knowledge. Such phrases as κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους (107.1), οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον (111.2), χρόνου ἐγγενομένου (113.1) make no claim to accurate knowledge and must not be stretched beyond what they claim. They contrast with precise information: δεκάτῳ ἔτει (103.1), ἔξ ἔτη πολεμήσαντα (110.1), διαλιπόντων ἑτῶν τριῶν (112.1); once even δευτέρῃ καὶ ἐξηκοστῇ ἡμέρῃ (108.2)—which he obviously does not withhold when he has it.

<sup>10</sup> Frank J. Frost, *Plutarch's Themistocles* (Princeton 1980) 211. Gomme, *Hist. Comm. on Thucydides* i (Oxford 1945) 397 f. expresses the same idea more verbosely. There is confusion in A. J. Podlecki,

In fact, Unz has here been guilty of doing precisely what he upbraids others for doing elsewhere: reading into Thucydides what the author never said or implied. Thucydides tells us nothing precise about Themistocles' movements in Asia—whether because he did not think them important or because he himself did not know. He does, however, report that the ship's captain who had taken him there was paid only later (ὑστερον), when Themistocles had succeeded in getting money sent by friends in Athens and bankers in Argos. How long this would take, we do not know; but weeks, or (more probably) months, must be allowed, for what was in part an illegal operation (cf. Plut. *Them.* 24.6; 25.3). Ephesus, admittedly, was not safe. but when we find Themistocles later (some months later?) going 'up country' μετὰ τῶν κάτω Περσῶν τινος, he is clearly setting out from an area under Persian control, and with a Persian official as guide. Magnesia on Maeander, later connected with Themistocles (see p. 20 below), only a day's trip from Ephesus, would be safe and obvious: it is not too bold to suggest that he waited there, until he had money to proceed in state, and until (no doubt) permission from the King had been obtained. Little can be got out of Phantias' tale that he met Artabanus at Susa (Plut. *Them.* 27), which would put his arrival there (a year after his letter to the King) before Xerxes' death: Thucydides cannot be rejected in favour of the moral tale. But the strong tradition—including Ephorus and therefore based on Asia where (as we know) the family of Themistocles survived in honour for a long time—that he arrived while Xerxes was on the throne (*ibid.*) should not be lightly rejected.<sup>11</sup> It does not in fact contradict Thucydides, who must again not be saddled with what he does not say: he tells us that Artaxerxes had 'recently succeeded' when Themistocles wrote his letter to the King, from somewhere 'up country' and after leaving the Aegean area. He will have waited (at Magnesia, as suggested above?) through the troubled time when Xerxes' death was rumoured, but not confirmed, from Susa, until things had settled down there. His arrival is best put early in 465, his departure and his letter at the earliest late that same year; but we cannot be precise.

We must next closely inspect Thucydides' wording regarding the revolt of Naxos and the battle of the Eurymedon. The former follows on the capture of Scyrus and Carystus (i 98.4): Ναξίοις δὲ ἀποστᾶσι μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπολέμησαν καὶ πολιορκίᾳ παρεστήσαντο. This leads into a digression (98.4–99) on revolts and their causes and effects, before the narrative resumes at 100.1: ἐγένετο δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἐπ' Εὐρυμέδοντι . . . πεζομαχία καὶ ναυμαχία. The question now arises: what precisely is the nature of the connection, at the point where the narrative resumes: what are the events after which the battle took place, and what is the point of καί? On only one other occasion in the *Pentecontaetia*, where μετὰ ταῦτα is one of the usual excruciating indications of time (indeed, nowhere else in the whole of Book i), does Thucydides use καί with it. There (108.4) the structure is lucid and the meaning clear: after these events (the victories in Boeotia, Phocis and Locris) the Aeginetans *as well* (as the inhabitants of those areas) came to terms with the Athenians. It is not at all clear, at first reading, as well as *what* the battle of the Eurymedon was fought. It cannot mean that the battle, like all the other revolts by allies, came after Naxos: that would be both trivial and highly misleading, since the analysis of the revolts is meant to cover decades. Yet there is nothing else mentioned after Naxos, for Eurymedon to share with.

I would suggest that Thucydides has been misunderstood at this point, where he returns from a digression and tries to reconnect his narrative. The μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ is his way of doing it:

*Themistocles* (Montreal 1975), which contains much the best summary of the sources (38 ff. *et al.*). On p. 197 Themistocles' 'arrival in Persia . . . probably took place early in 464' (with the evidence promised for later); on pp. 198 f. the Naxian war is 'between 469 and 467', with a two- or three-year gap 'between this and Themistocles' arrival in Ionia in late 465 or early 464' and in Susa a year later. No interval of this length should be assumed at any point.

<sup>11</sup> If Plutarch is right in putting Themistocles' Ionian landfall at Cyeme, Ephorus should have had some local tradition about such an important event to follow. Certainly, nothing in Thucydides contradicts the report of his arrival *in Asia* before Xerxes' death: it must be

stressed, against Unz and (long before him) Gomme, that Thucydides neither says nor implies anything as to the length of Themistocles' stay near the coast, except (as Gomme, but not Unz, saw) for the delay due to his having to get his money sent over from Greece. The various romantic tales regarding Themistocles' interview with Xerxes should certainly not be preferred to Thucydides' statement. (See, e.g., Diod. xi 57 ff., presumably from Ephorus, and the reference to Phantias in Plutarch, mentioned in the text.) But they may be spun out of a tradition that Themistocles did arrive under Xerxes and that Xerxes was informed of his arrival.

it takes up the *μετὰ ταῦτα* of 98.4 and is intended to let us know (after the digression) that, in addition to the revolt of Naxos, something else *also* happened after the same events (the capture of Scyrus and Carystus), viz. the battle of the Eurymedon. If this is correct, we must posit rough contemporaneity between Naxos and the Eurymedon, and not succession. But there is more to be said. It is commonly assumed that the Naxos affair was over in a single season. There is no warrant for this in the text, and it is historically unlikely. In the only other cases of wars against major allied states in this period (Thasos and Samos), we know how difficult victory was, and how long the fighting: three seasons in the one case, two in the other. At a time when Athenian power and skill was much less overwhelming, Naxos is not likely to have been significantly easier; indeed, the Naxians must have thought (as Thasos still did) that Athens could be beaten. In the case of Thasos, the length of the siege is an integral part of the story; for the Thasians, too weak to win on their own, turn to the Spartans for aid, are promised aid (so Thucydides would have us believe), but this is prevented by the earthquake and the Messenian revolt, so that the Thasians have to surrender in the third season. Both the earthquake and the revolt are major events in Thucydides' account, leading on to the first open *διαφορά* between Sparta and Athens (102.3); and the promised aid is essential in supporting Thucydides' presentation of Sparta's malevolent designs and ultimate responsibility for the War. The Naxos story has none of these elements. Thucydides needs it merely as the first of the revolts against Athens. The siege and capture take up four words, leading to the reflections in the digression. The negative conclusion, that the war as such was quick and easy, is totally unjustified: we are not told how long it took, any more than we know how long (e.g.) the siege of Eion took. But at least two seasons, with a winter intervening, must surely be allowed, in the light of the other major rebellions. If Themistocles encountered the Athenian fleet at Naxos early in 465, as seems likely, we may put the siege either in 466–65 or in 465–64, if we allow two seasons for it. In fact, three, as in the case of Thasos, would not be absurd, given the size and importance of Naxos; so that 467 is not totally excluded for Eurymedon. But let us allow two, for the sake of argument, since this is all we need here. It will at once be clear that 465–64 will not work (Unz's calculations suffice to show this), and so it must be 466–65.

Next, it is quite untrue that, as Unz thinks, the battle of the Eurymedon could be fought only after Naxos had been subdued. The assumption is not argued; and if it is unnecessary even on the implausible hypothesis of a single campaign against Naxos, it becomes untenable if we allow two. We should not need the parallel of Thasos (where other ventures could be launched in the north during the three seasons of the revolt) to make us realise that, once Naxos' navy had been destroyed (which it presumably would be near the very beginning of the war), this would be followed by a landing on the island and a siege, as at Samos and at Thasos; after which, only a force large enough to keep up the siege was needed on the island, and more would be a positive disadvantage, since supplies would have to be shipped to them; as for ships, since Naxos could expect no help from anyone, unlike Samos and (if we believe it) Thasos, only a small screening force would be left behind. If Naxos rebelled early in 466 (for obvious reasons, already discussed, the rebellion cannot be put after Eurymedon), then there would be plenty of time for the siege to be set up and for the main forces of the alliance to leave for Asia Minor and, late in the summer, fight the battle there. This (I think) fits in with all the positive evidence we have and avoids the difficulties caused both by the 'fundamentalist' interpretations attacked by Unz and by his own unsatisfactory discussion of these events.

As for Themistocles, being a shrewd man who had too often turned out to be on the wrong side in the end, he apparently preferred to obtain the insecure new King's permission to wait another year while he prepared himself for the royal presence—and to wait to see how things would turn out at Susa before he committed himself. By the time he finally arrived there (despite Phanias' story in Plutarch, clearly long after the removal of Artabanus), it must have been at least late 464, perhaps early 463, and Artaxerxes received him as an honoured guest. We shall have to come back to him.

In view of recent re-examination of the chronology concerned, long discussion has been necessary to show that the battle of the Eurymedon does indeed best fit into 466. We can now state with some confidence that it was fought in late summer of that year, and that there is no

reason why it should not have been followed by peace between Athens and Xerxes before Xerxes' death. We shall soon see that this can be further supported.

On the other hand, the idea—a favourite with those scholars who do not believe in any formal peace—that there could be a *de facto* peace without any formal ceremony is not easy to accept, in Greek conditions as we know them. One need not enter into the 'chicken-and-egg' question of whether war or peace was regarded as the 'natural' (i.e., treaty-less) state in the Greek world of the Classical period, for it is at any rate clear that in fully historical times any change from one to the other had to be formalised by a ritual act. Even a truce long enough to recover one's dead had to be confirmed by oath. That a long period of major hostilities should be followed by a *de facto* peace, with demonstrable trade and frequent embassies, without any formal process seems rather a desperate hypothesis, and one is entitled to ask its propounders for some positive proof. Without formal agreements, both ships and persons would surely have been liable to instant seizure, and such incidents could hardly have altogether escaped our knowledge, defective though that is. We need only look at Thucydides ii 67 *fin.* for Spartan practice during the Peloponnesian War, or at Demosthenes xxiv (*Ag. Timocrates*) for fourth-century Athens, to form a realistic picture of what to expect where there was no formal agreement between states. The Demosthenic example, in fact, is particularly instructive. Although charges of impropriety arose, no one questioned the basic right of Athenians to seize an 'enemy' ship as a legitimate prize, even though the 'war' had, to say the least, not been strenuously or continuously prosecuted, and the captain was quite probably not aware of its existence.

We shall soon see other reasons for believing that a formal peace existed, on something like the terms reported by later authors. For the moment, these general considerations should suffice to show that an 'informal' peace is a rather implausible concept. Our conclusion, therefore, is that it was quite probably Xerxes himself who made peace with Cimon's brother-in-law, not too long before his death; and that the embassy found at the court of Artaxerxes, early in his reign, was there in order to assure itself of the continuation of that peace under Xerxes' successor. For no matter what the terms of a peace (and we shall see at the end of this article that in this particular instance more than usual depended on the person of the King), its acceptance by a King's successor could never be taken for granted.

It might be objected that in that case Callias' purpose at Susa was very close to that of the Argive embassy, and Herodotus, although not strictly telling a lie, must be assumed to be highly misleading in implying a major difference between their missions. This should be faced, and accepted. For we must surely recognise that Herodotus is in any case deliberately suppressing what the Athenian embassy was doing. It was obviously not a minor matter of routine (*that* did not take prominent Greeks as far as Susa), and it cannot have been many years before his arrival at Athens: he succeeded in obtaining far more recondite information about far earlier events. Nor would he omit an important item simply because of irrelevance at a particular point: on the contrary, as he himself admits, he loved an interesting excursus (iv 30). If he did not tell us what Callias' mission was doing, it was because he chose not to.

So far I agree with what is essentially Meister's point (44 ff.). Where we part company, however, is over the reason for Herodotus' choice. Meister argues that it must be the failure of the peace negotiations; and he connects this, rather oddly, with the statement by Demosthenes (xix 273) that Callias was fined on his return, even though Demosthenes himself tells that story in connection with the actual conclusion of a peace.<sup>12</sup> Meister thinks that, since the peace is

<sup>12</sup> Meister 46 f., adding the Ceramicus ostraca with Callias' name as further evidence for the unpopularity incurred by his mission to Susa. (I do not think that the ostraca can be dated.) As a point of method, it seems unjustified to accept Demosthenes' story of the conviction and reject the report of the conclusion of peace on which Demosthenes in fact bases it. The rejection seems

to be based solely on Meister's view that the peace was too glorious for conviction to be conceivable. We cannot tell whether the story of the fine is authentic or a fourth-century moral tale. If it is authentic, the trial and conviction should be set in the context of the Ephialtic reforms which led to the overturning of the peace itself (see Section II below). Since the events would be only a

universally described as glorious by the later sources reporting it, Herodotus would not have failed to report it, had it been concluded at this time. (And presumably this would also apply to a renewal under a new King.) However, this overlooks an important point: the fact that, after the King's Peace and by contrast with it (which is when we first hear of Callias' peace), the peace looked glorious is irrelevant to how it would look in Herodotus' day, or to Herodotus himself. As we shall see, there was at least room for a difference of opinion on how to regard it. And as for Herodotus, he was celebrating Athens as the champion of Hellas against the Barbarian, even at the expense of Sparta: hence his continuation of his account through the siege of Sestos, which marked Sparta's first loss of interest and of leadership and Athens' first step towards a hegemonial role. Nothing would have less fitted into the picture he was trying to paint than to tell us, in a casual aside arising out of an incident attesting the conspicuous and continuing Medism of Argos, that the Athenians came to terms with the Barbarian a few years later. The fact that Herodotus does not report a peace, whether at this point or earlier, cannot be used as proof that no peace was made. On the other hand, Herodotus' coy refusal to tell us what Callias was up to, in his *prima facie* surprising presence at Susa, suffices to show that something that Herodotus would have thought disreputable was going on.

If peace was indeed made in Xerxes' day, there was no question that it would be ratified in Athens. Cimon was at the height of his power—so much so that, when we first hear of an attempted attack on his position, after his return from the north in (probably) 463, it ended in failure. As I have suggested, the person of Cimon's brother-in-law would in fact help to reassure the King, who was always given to regarding international relations in personal terms, that the 'rulers' of Athens were serious about it. Even at the time of Artaxerxes' accession, when Callias returned to Athens with a renewal of the peace, or just possibly with the first formal peace made, acceptance in Athens should still be presumed. The embassy would certainly be back some time in 463—a time when Cimon could be attacked, but not yet defeated. The reforms of Ephialtes, fortunately, are one of the few dated events in this period: they came in 462/1 (*Ath. pol.* 25.2). Before midsummer of 462, Callias' embassy could not be disowned.

## II

This brings us to the Athenian background of the 460s, the struggle between Cimon and his opponents against which these events took place and which must obviously be correlated with them. As we have noted, in the first part of the decade, Cimon, supported by the prestige of the return of the bones of 'Theseus' and the victory at the Eurymedon and strengthened by the allegiance of the Areopagus, seems to have been unchallenged. As Plutarch (*Per.* 7) makes clear, this was the time when young Pericles, son of the man who had successfully prosecuted Cimon's father and driven him to death in disgrace (*Hdt.* vi 136; *cf.* *Plut. Cim.* 4.4), despaired of being able to enter upon a political career. It is only on his return from the North that Cimon can be prosecuted (whatever the technical details of the prosecution),<sup>13</sup> an event in which Pericles for the first time appears (not too gloriously) in a leading role. He had to abandon the prosecution, clearly (whatever later gossip suggested) because the time was not yet ripe for a conviction. It was not long after this that Cimon, against strong opposition, persuaded the People to support

year or two apart, slight foreshortening, a century later, would easily abolish the interval and misinterpret the context. In any case, the facts connected by Demosthenes must be either accepted or rejected *in toto*.

<sup>13</sup> On this (not important in detail here) see *Ath. pol.* 25 ff. (confused); *Plut. Cimon* 14 f.; *Per.* 7 and 9 (embroidered). *Ath. pol.* is so ill informed that the statement that the prosecution was at Cimon's *euthynai*

may be a mere guess. Plutarch's statement that Pericles was chosen as prosecutor by the People does not merit any more confidence. It is clear from his account how the story of the first clash between the two men was later adorned with romantic fiction. Precise details may not have been known by the middle of the fourth century.



Sparta against the rebellious helots.<sup>14</sup> As Wade-Gery saw long ago, Pericles' introduction of pay for jury service is dated to this period (the late sixties) in our sources (*Ath. pol.* 27.3 f.; Plut. *Per.* 9.2). In practice, it marked the first admission of citizens of the poorest class to the courts, and it must certainly have played its part in enabling Ephialtes to obtain the conviction of Areopagites for past financial misdemeanours, presumably during their tenure of the archonship. (We do not know of any money handled by Areopagites as such.) If Cimon was prosecuted before a court (which our sources do not allow us to determine with any assurance), we might speculate that the idea for the reform may have come to Pericles through his failure in that trial; but it was not difficult to think of in any case, and Ephialtes' plan of discrediting the governing circles by prosecuting Areopagites may have sufficed to suggest it. They would presumably have been much more likely to gain acquittal from their peers in wealth.

It is also at precisely this time, of the rivalry between Cimon and Ephialtes and Pericles, that we must put the famous incidents reported (from Callisthenes) by Plutarch (*Cimon* 13.4): the naval sweeps by Pericles with fifty ships and by Ephialtes with thirty (we do not know in what order or precisely in what years) beyond the Chelidonian Islands, without meeting any Persian resistance. Meiggs dates these actions correctly, unlike some other scholars;<sup>15</sup> but he regards them as 'action following up the Eurymedon'—which in an objective sense is no doubt correct, in that the sweeps could not have been conceived of before that victory, but which misleadingly suggests collaboration between Cimon and the two commanders, where our sources clearly attest political opposition. In view of that testimony, we must surely take the naval sweeps as demonstrating opposition in one major sphere, that of foreign policy—not surprisingly, since those sources do happen to record it not only over domestic matters, but also over policy towards Sparta, and even Macedon. Policy towards Persia might be expected to be no less controversial.

In fact, it seems clear that opposition would take the same line in that case as in the other two: just as Pericles had prosecuted Cimon for lack of a vigorous policy towards Macedon, and Ephialtes opposed him for not pursuing a vigorous policy towards Sparta, so both of them would have good reason to cry out against his seeking peace with the Barbarian. We need not assume that they were trying to disrupt the peace that Cimon either was trying to make or had already made: this must be stressed because it has persistently been stated (most recently by Walsh and by Meister) that Pericles and Ephialtes were deliberately breaking the terms of the peace. From this it can be further argued that the peace was at once destroyed, or that there cannot have been a peace at all, which is the conclusion these two scholars respectively arrived at. But the assertion is not supported by anything we know about the peace. Indeed, if the naval sweeps had been undertaken while negotiations were going on, they might have worried the King. But if they had come as close as that to Eurymedon, and before any peace terms were agreed upon, the obvious question must be asked: why do we hear only of naval sweeps and not of any landfall in enemy territory, which would be an obvious aim and corollary of such a sweep in normal conditions (cf. Thuc. i 96.1)? Why was no booty taken from the unprotected enemy coast? There is only one plausible answer; but before we come to it, we must first look at the error shared by Walsh and Meister with many of their predecessors over the terms of the peace itself.

It is a common misapprehension that there was a *Fahrtgrenze* laid down in its terms: a line that marked a limit beyond which fleets, from east and west respectively, might not proceed; in fact, something

<sup>14</sup> The chronological problems connected with the revolt and the Athenian expedition(s) are well known and need not be discussed here. If there were two Spartan appeals, as Hammond has argued, then the first must be placed earlier and might lead to an earlier date for Eurymedon; only the second would come in 463–2.

<sup>15</sup> Meiggs, *Ath. Emp.* 79. Unz, strangely, shows no interest in these actions, any more than in the Peace of Callias, even though they are surely important for any scheme of chronology proposed for the Pentecontaetia. The lists in C. W. Fornara, *The Athenian board of generals from 501 to 404* (Wiesbaden 1971), do not include

Ephialtes at all, and Pericles only in 454/3. Since Pericles was in his thirties by 463, there is no reason why the date suggested by the link with Ephialtes should not be followed. D. M. Lewis (*Sparta and Persia* [Leiden 1977]—a book to which I owe a great deal—60 n. 68) is not at his best on this. He does not mention Ephialtes and, as regards Pericles, writes: 'I find it impossible to believe that Pericles was general in the 460s' (he does not tell us why); he goes on to suggest that the right context for Pericles' naval sweep is the Samian War: 'the difference between Kallisthenes' 50 ships and Thucydides' 60 is hardly important' (*sic*)!

comparable to a frontier on land. This view was rejected by Meiggs (*Ath. Emp.* 147 f.), but as recent work has shown, his argument has not been heeded. The theory of the *Fahrtgrenze* is in fact a purely modern construct, and not the only one of its kind in ancient history. It is worth recalling that, when Polybius mentions an obligation by Hasdrubal not to cross the Ebro with an army, modern scholars have more often than not made this into a reciprocal obligation, binding the Romans as well, in the same terms—and that even though Polybius, in this instance, plainly tells us that nothing of the sort was stipulated.<sup>16</sup> In our case, not a single source reports a limitation on the movement of Athenian fleets; and although it is conceivable that such a limitation might have been in the treaty, but not mentioned through patriotic misrepresentation, the fact is that we have no positive evidence at all for such a limitation. It is surely not proper method to construct it when it is not reported, and then to assert that an instance that runs counter to the construct was in fact a breach of the imagined provision.

It is more profitable to scrutinise the fact we have already noted: the failure of either of these leaders of a successful and unopposed expedition to bring home booty captured on the enemy's undefended coastline. There seems to be but one possible explanation for such remarkable restraint, contrasting with what we know of other Athenian commanders on numerous other occasions. There can be no doubt that any peace between Athens and the King would forbid attacks on the territory of either signatory by the other. The fact that Ephialtes and Pericles, on separate occasions, refrained from attacking the King's territory can be explained only on the hypothesis that there was already a peace in existence which they would not break: indeed, they could not have ventured to break a formal peace without positive authorization by the Assembly, which at this time (the time of Cimon's ascendancy) was unthinkable. Any actual breach of a peace recently agreed to would have meant the end of a man's career. The story quoted by Plutarch from Callisthenes as allegedly an argument *against* the existence of a peace turns out to be a powerful argument *for* it. It is only the assumption that the peace would be broken by the naval sweeps themselves that has prevented the patent fact from emerging. Unfortunately this does not succeed in securely dating the peace. However, it is helpful for that purpose. Since we are told that the two expeditions were separate, we must surely assign them to different years; and even if they took place in *successive* years, it is so difficult as to seem almost impossible to fit both of them in after a peace concluded only with Artaxerxes, i.e. not before 463, yet before Cimon's policies could be openly overturned (462/1). The probability of a peace concluded under Xerxes and only confirmed by Callias' embassy to Artaxerxes is considerably increased by the testimony of these naval expeditions.

Against the background of the peace recently concluded, and the general opposition to Cimon's policies on the part of these two leaders, their intention can now be interpreted. As we have seen, they were in no position actually to destroy the peace. But, first, they could not succeed against the supremacy based on naval *strategiai* which Cimon had built up without demonstrating at least some skill (such as could at that point be demonstrated) at naval command. More important: whatever the Persian reaction to these expeditions, it could be turned to political advantage. If Persian ships came out to fight, under the extreme provocation of seeing Athenian fleets close to their shoreline, they would certainly have lost: the peace would have been broken by the enemy (if the Assembly could be persuaded to take this view of the action, which was quite likely), and the very victory would show that it was unnecessary to leave the Barbarian in peace when he was in no condition to challenge Athenian power. If (as was more likely, and as indeed happened) there was no opposition, then that would give the Athenian commanders cheap glory, and would show that (as Callisthenes later interpreted it) the Persians were now too weak and frightened to resist even a demonstration of enemy power deep within their sphere: hence, again, it would be argued that it was unnecessary to let the Barbarian

<sup>16</sup> Pol. ii 13.7 (explicit); cf. iii 27.9. On this see my comments in *Miscellanea Eugenio Manni* (Rome 1980) 159 ff. Walsh's idea (*Chiron* xi [1981] 46 f.), in further refinement of this misconception, that the limit was

imposed *only* on the Athenians and their allies and not on the Persians at all rests on a strange mistranslation of the Greek and, of course, runs counter to much of the other evidence regarding the peace.

have peace when he was helpless. In fact, Pericles and Ephialtes risked nothing and, in all foreseeable circumstances, could not lose. There can be no doubt that these expeditions were a powerful force in turning public opinion against Cimon's eastern policy and robbing his peace of the glory he had no doubt hoped to gain from it. The positive reversal of that policy—the attack on the King's territory—had to wait until the new leaders were securely in power; indeed, Ephialtes was quite probably dead before it began.<sup>17</sup> However, his recognition of the fact that the great *strategos* could be defeated only by *strategoí* helped to carry him to political victory.

Once Cimon was ostracized, one of the first actions of the new leaders was to launch an expedition against Cyprus, soon diverted (in whole or in part) to Egypt; just as in Greece Cimon's pro-Spartan policy was reversed by an alliance with Argos and an attack on the Peloponnesian League. Even in the north, where Cimon's failure to attack Macedon had provided the grounds for his unsuccessful prosecution, active steps were taken. The line had to be drawn somewhere, and even the new activism could not combine an attack on Macedon with attacks on Sparta and Persia, which were politically more important. However, the groundwork was laid for the future, by means of an alliance with the Thessalians,<sup>18</sup> precisely corresponding to that with Argos in the south: Thessaly would provide a base for the future attack on Macedon, when the time came, and Thessalian cavalry would be essential in actually implementing it.

Modern scholars have tended to ignore the clear evidence for consistent political opposition to Cimon's policies, foreign as well as domestic, on the part of the opponents who overthrew him. We may fitly conclude this section with a quotation from Gomme's *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, which can stand for most opinions expressed since it was written: 'There was no break in Athenian policy in the East after the ostracism of Cimon.'<sup>19</sup> Proper consideration of the Peace of Callias—concluded under Cimon's supremacy by his brother-in-law and demonstrably in effect before his overthrow; then swept away, with the rest of his policies, when his enemies took over the state—should have sufficed to make such judgements impossible.

### III

It is not our task here to trace the failure, ultimately on all fronts, of the expansionist policy that followed Cimon's ostracism, with Pericles clearly the link between the attack on Cimon before and the reversal of his policies after. Nor is this the place to comment fully on the Citizenship Decree (*Ath. pol.* 26.3 f.), one of the very few laws (another, much later, is the

<sup>17</sup> Probably and not certainly, since our evidence on all these events is far worse than is often realised. Neither the date of Ephialtes' death nor the date when operations in the East began can be stated with real confidence. As to the former, *Ath. pol.* dates it 'not long after' the reforms (25.2) and (later) in the sixth year before the decision to admit *zeugitai* to the archonship (26.2). Mnesitheides (archon 457/6) is said to have been the first *zeugites* elected under this law, which would put it in 458/7. But Ephialtes cannot have died before the year in which his reforms were passed (462/1), which is (by inclusive count) the sixth year before 457/6. Hence the author has (to us, inextricably) confused the date of the law with the date of the first tenure under the law. We therefore cannot trust him sufficiently to put Ephialtes' death before the end of 462/1. On the other hand, Thucydides is here at his most obscure. He tells us (i 104.2) that in what appears to be the spring of 460, when the appeal from Egypt came, the Athenians *ἔτυχον ἐς Κύπρον στρατευόμενοι*—it is not clear whether they were about to set out, or already on their way, or already there; nor, of course, whether this was

the first expedition to Cyprus or whether there had been one before (e.g. in the previous year) which (like so many other events) he did not regard as sufficiently important to mention: it is mentioned here, clearly, because it is its diversion to Egypt that makes it important. Nor does his statement that they now 'left' Cyprus (*ἀπολιπόντες*) securely tell us whether they were already on the island or merely abandoned it as a target. We cannot even be quite sure whether or not the invasion of Cyprus continued (on a reduced scale). The fact that Thucydides never mentions it again is inconclusive: cf. the attack on Egypt in 450 (112.3), never again referred to except for its end. All this unfortunately makes it impossible to discuss the Eastern policy of the new leaders with real precision, although the general picture is clear enough.

<sup>18</sup> Thuc. i 102.4. This should not be dissociated from the attack on Cimon after his return from the north, a mere two or three years before.

<sup>19</sup> Gomme, *HCT* i 306. It should be noted that in his actual discussion the facts force him into considerable qualification of this statement.

Megarian Decree) that we know stood in Pericles' own name.<sup>20</sup> What is significant here is that it marks the change in Pericles' attitude to empire from exuberant expansionism (which had been demonstrated by him as a follower of Ephialtes and which had brought both of them to power) to an intensivist policy, limiting further expansion to where it was strategically feasible while increasing the actual profits of empire by peace and organised exploitation. The lesson had no doubt been learnt in the Egyptian disaster of 454 and the heavy losses it inflicted on Athens: such risks could clearly not be taken again. The Citizenship Decree of 451/50 announces and implies the peace treaties with both Persia and Sparta which it now became Pericles' aim to secure, and the change from 'Delian League' to Athenian Empire. The process of transformation, once embarked upon, turned out to be remarkably quick.

Whether Cimon was in Athens while attitudes were changing under the impact of failure cannot be disengaged with real assurance from the mythopoeia of our sources. The story of his recall after the battle of Tanagra, supposedly on the motion of Pericles himself, is well known (Plut. *Per.* 10; *Cimon* 17, *fin.*).<sup>21</sup> That Pericles himself moved the recall can almost certainly be regarded as a piece of dramatic fiction, the more so as we find it embroidered by the usual ἐνιοί with a secret agreement between them, arranged (inevitably) through the agency of Elpinice (who had already been cast in this role in connection with the earlier prosecution of Cimon by Pericles), to the effect that Cimon was to attack the King's territory with two hundred ships, while Pericles was to have 'power' within Athens.<sup>22</sup> And the association of the recall, in nearly all the sources, with an immediate truce between Sparta and Athens, must surely rest on confusion with the five-year truce mentioned by Thucydides (I 112.1) at a much later date than is conceivable for Cimon's recall, which according to our specific sources for it was the result of the battle of Tanagra. That there was no major truce after Tanagra (the four months' truce of Diod. xi 80, *fin.* may be fact) is clear from the various actions against the Peloponnesian League recorded by Thucydides I 108.2–5 and I 11.2 (without precise dates, but clearly between Tanagra and three years before the five years' truce) and (with arbitrary dates) by Diodorus.

Diodorus puts the five years' truce in 454/3, and tells us that it was negotiated by Cimon (xi 86.1). Unz has recently tried to argue that a recall from ostracism presupposes a major emergency (which can be supported by the recall of the exiles at the outbreak of the war against Xerxes); and since Tanagra did not produce an emergency, he dates Cimon's recall after the Egyptian disaster, which clearly did. This would fit in with Diodorus' date for the five years' truce, but cannot be reconciled with even the minimal indications of date deducible from Thucydides. Nor will the chronology of the recall allow it, for Theopompus dates it to the fifth year after the ostracism, i.e. not later than 457/6 (even if we put the ostracism a year after the reforms of Ephialtes in 462/1 and not in the same year); and that corresponds well enough to a plausible date for the battle of Tanagra.<sup>23</sup> If we believe the recall, it cannot be

<sup>20</sup> For some aspects of the law, see S. C. Humphreys, *JHS* xciv (1974) 88 ff. A comprehensive general survey without profound analysis will be found in Cynthia Patterson, *Pericles' citizenship law of 451–50 BC* (Salem 1981).

<sup>21</sup> It appears, in one form or another, in several sources. Unz (p. 76) cites Plutarch, Theopompus, Aristides, Nepos and Andocides (in this order, and without discussion of precise relevance, relationship or credibility; the statement that Andocides 'says that Kimon was recalled from exile in order to make peace with Sparta and did so' is more misleading than the qualification regarding the orator's confusion admits: Andocides *in fact* says that Miltiades was recalled from his ostracism in Chersonese in order that he should be sent, as Spartan *proxenos*, to make peace with Sparta, and that he concluded the Thirty Years' Peace). He sums it up as 'an overwhelming weight of evidence', and believes all of it except for what does not suit his case (the connection with Tanagra attested by Plutarch and probably known to Theopompus).

<sup>22</sup> The ἐνιοί seem to include (or to be) Idomeneus, whom Plutarch rightly tells us to disbelieve. Unz thinks

the part allegedly played by Pericles 'especially supportive [of the story of the recall]: such an unlikely fact is not easily invented'(!). He does not mention the use of dramatic colour in biographical and later historical tradition, nor comment on the part of Elpinice.

<sup>23</sup> Theopompus' date seems to presuppose the Tanagra correlation. If (as suggested in the text) his recall was enough to stop Spartan action against Athens at a critical time, this might later easily be confused with the five years' truce which Thucydides seems to put in 450 (see Appendix). Unz (79 n. 48) thinks the dates 'can be accommodated'. First, Cimon has to leave for Sparta as late as spring 461, with Ephialtes' reforms following still before midsummer; then Cimon has to stay in Sparta 'for seven or eight months' after the reforms before being sent home, in order to make it possible for him to return to Athens 'too late for the first round of the ostracism vote of 461/0' [which the new leaders, with unusual courtesy, apparently delayed until his return home with his presumed supporters]. Thus the ostracism is finally voted only in the eighth prytany of 460/59, and Cimon then left 'within a few weeks of the end of the 460/59 Athenian political year', with the result

dissociated from its connection with Tanagra, even if the alleged immediate reason for it (that the Athenians feared a Spartan invasion and relied on Cimon to stop it) may be Plutarch's own idea. As for the supposed parallel with the Persian War, it is difficult to see one, unless indeed we think that Cimon was at this time the only Athenian in exile. The recall of one victim of ostracism is very different from a general amnesty for exiles, and looks (as the sources indeed say) like a personal favour.

It should be clear that certainty on this is unattainable, in view of the delight of our sources in embroidering the motif of the recall. That Cimon negotiated the five years' truce should be believed; but the date for it given by Diodorus cannot prevail against that to be deduced from Thucydides. But if indeed Cimon was allowed to return after Tanagra, as a special favour, it must have been on condition that he should not take part in public business: in other words, the ostracism was reduced to what, in the fourth century, was to be called *atimia*. I am inclined to think that this alleviation may be the true foundation on which the variants of the story were later based. His presence in the city (even without political rights) may explain the fact that the Spartans did not exploit the Egyptian disaster by launching an immediate attack on Athens, but let Athens recover for three years, until the truce was officially sworn. (That the *Athenians* were inactive during those years, 454–451, requires no explanation, after the losses they had suffered in Egypt and the consequent need to devote their resources to safeguarding their control of the League.) Cimon's recall may have aided those in Sparta who believed (as Cimon and his supporters did in Athens) that the accord between the two powers ought to be restored, and who now saw a genuine possibility of this in the near future: such an accord, of course, would have outweighed any immediate gain to be won from an attack on a weakened Athens after 454. Acceptance of Cimon's recall thus helps us propound an answer to one of the problems of the late 450s that Thucydides chooses to ignore. Later sources would easily confuse this absence of hostility that followed his premature return with the truce actually arranged at the proper expiration of his term of ostracism.

Whether or not it was due to Cimon's fortuitous presence in Athens, the breathing-space the Athenians thus gained gave Pericles time for reassessing his policy. As we have suggested, he used it wisely, and decided to initiate a change in the whole Athenian conception of the hegemony over the allies. The Citizenship Decree erected an impassable barrier between Athens and her allies and stopped for all time the intermarriages that must have resulted from the constant travel by Athenians to allied cities and the visits of large numbers of allies to Athens as the hegemonial power. At the same time, the transfer of the League treasury from Delos to Athens, from the patronage of Ionian Apollo to that of Athena, had provided both a symbolic and a practical background for the demarcation of the Athenian 'master race', which could not fail to profit in obvious ways from the concomitant geographical limitation of its ambitions.

This gave Cimon his chance. As soon as his term of ostracism had expired and the truce with Sparta was sworn, he led an expedition to Egypt and Cyprus. (We shall discuss the details in the Appendix below.) Athens was to resume leadership of the allies against the Barbarian. The political wheel had come full circle, and Cimon was using against Pericles' new policy the very weapons that Pericles, under Ephialtes' guidance, had successfully employed against him: he would show how the Egyptian disaster suffered under Pericles' leadership could be avenged. Whether Pericles opposed the expedition, we cannot tell. He may well have welcomed it. If Cimon was successful, major political conflict lay ahead, and an uncertain outcome. But if Pericles' new policy of external peace was to become feasible, the King would in any case have to be taught a lesson; and there is probably this much truth to the story of the secret compact between Pericles and Cimon, that Pericles thought it safer to stay in Athens and risk the political consequences of Cimon's victory than to hand the city over to his opponent and, with doubtful prospects, himself seek to avenge his military failure.

In the end, Pericles was lucky beyond what could have been reasonably expected. The gods truly showed him their favour: it is no wonder that he before long gave Athena a magnificent

that it was only the next year (459/8) that was 'traditionally recorded as the first (full) year of his ostracism'. After this, the recall can be placed in 455/4, in the early summer of 454, conveniently already after

the Egyptian disaster. Further comment seems superfluous, except that it should perhaps be noted that Unz does not mention that Theopompus connects the recall with the 'outbreak' of war with Sparta.

reward. Cimon's expedition ended in the major naval victory off Cyprian Salamis, which almost rivalled that of the other Salamis in its glory and perhaps surpassed it in its effect (for the Persian fleet was swept off the seas beyond hope of quick recovery);<sup>24</sup> and by the time the crowning victory was won, Cimon was dead. Pericles reaped the profit, at no political cost or risk. He could now make peace with the Barbarian without inviting political attack at home, and proceed to carry out his new policies.

Once peace with the King was to be renewed, there was no doubt as to who was to be entrusted with the difficult task of persuading him that, this time, the Athenians could be trusted. Personal connections were always essential in diplomatic contacts with the King and his satraps, even had the task not been so delicate. It was for this reason that Sparta later sent Antalcidas on a number of missions, to Sardis and to Susa. He, as we happen to be told, was the King's ξένος and even φίλος (Plut. *Artox.* 22). The Athenian Timagoras, although we have no attestation of his rank, seems (to judge by his treatment) to have been in the same class, even though the Athenian *demos*, for good reasons, preferred not to profit by this. But more trustworthy Athenians are attested as the King's guest-friends. Pericles' friend Ppyrilampes went on at least one, and quite possibly more than one, embassy to Susa, and more to Sardis.<sup>25</sup> He was the first Athenian (perhaps the first Greek) to be given a pair of peacocks as a guest-friend's gift: Athenian wit (Plut. *Per.* 13.15, perhaps based on a comedy) suggested that he used the exotic birds to procure women for Pericles. His son Demus later exhibited them to the public; he may even have charged admission for seeing them.<sup>26</sup> Demus himself, no doubt through the inherited connection, was chosen to go to the King, we do not even know when or how often; and this very item helps to illustrate both the state of our information on Athenian relations with the King and the fact that embassies to Susa came to be regarded as normal and not always worth reporting. We hear of this one only by chance, when we find Demus, before 390, in possession of a gold *phiale* worth more than 16 minae (the sum for which he expected to pawn it—so its value may have been *considerably* higher) given to him by the King as a *symbolon*; i.e., he too was officially (in Greek terminology) the King's ξένος.<sup>27</sup> He was presumably expected to take it with him whenever he went on an embassy to the King or to a satrap. This was how Achaemenid diplomacy operated. There can be no question that Pericles was well aware of it.

The choice of Callias for the mission was inevitable. It was fortunate that he was still alive and active: a few years later, we find him negotiating the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta. Davies, in unfortunate language, speaks of Callias' 'shift to the Left', in that he now undertook missions on behalf of Pericles.<sup>28</sup> The terms of modern political topography are best avoided. But the point that must be made is that there was surely no shift in Callias' policy: if he made peace with both Persia and Sparta, that was just what he had learnt under Cimon. It was Pericles who had come round to a policy that was basically Cimonian, at least in foreign affairs. Callias, quite probably elected *strategos*, set about repairing the disasters caused by the abandonment of

<sup>24</sup> See the epigram in Diod. xi 62.3, which is generally agreed to refer to this occasion. Cf. E. Badian and J. Buckler in *RhM* cxviii (1975) 226–39, and, for the chronology, my Appendix below with text.

<sup>25</sup> Plato, *Charm.* 158a ('whenever' he went). That he went to Susa together with Callias has been suggested and, of course, is quite possible; but it is only a guess. We must not underestimate the number of such embassies during the time of peace (see n. 27 and text).

<sup>26</sup> Athen. ix 397c; cf. Ael. *HA* v 21 (the admission charge). By the time of Aristophanes, peacocks had become the standard gift and status symbol of ambassadors to the King: Dicaopolis says he is getting tired of them (*Acharn.* 63). J. K. Davies (*Athenian propertied families* [Oxford 1971] 330) describes the peacocks as a *symbolon*—a term correct in principle, but presumably not to be taken literally.

<sup>27</sup> For the *phiale* see Lys. xix (*Aristoph.*) 25—fortunately making it clear that it was a personal gift to Demus, not inherited from his father. See further M. Vickers in *AJAH* ix (1984), forthcoming. For the King's *xenoi* in general, see Hdt. viii 85.3 and cf. Nymphis, *FGrH* 432 F 6.

<sup>28</sup> Davies, *APF* 259 (with all the source references). For Callias as the negotiator of the Thirty Years' Peace see Diod. xii 7. Davies accepts (with proper misgivings) the modern story that Callias had at some time divorced Cimon's sister Elpinice, since this substantiates his 'shift to the Left'. It is based on nothing more than her burial not far from her distinguished brother, which may be explained in any number of ways. We do not hear of Callias' marrying anyone else, and we do not know whether he survived her.

Cimon's policy due to his enemies. He helped restore—for Athens, we might say, rather than for Pericles—what he had helped his brother-in-law build up.

As against the multitude of fourth-century and later sources that bear witness to the peace after the battle of the Eurymedon, this second peace is thinly attested. Only three sources appear to mention it, none of them trustworthy: Diodorus (xii 4), Aristodemus (*FGrH* 104 F 13) and the *Suda* (s.v. 'Καλλίας' 214 [A]). Had it not been for the attested absence of hostilities and occasional glimpses of normal relations between the two powers, for about a generation after this time, no one would have been tempted to believe that assortment of witnesses. As it is, it is little short of astonishing that late and demonstrably unreliable sources should have their evidence in a negative sense (i.e., the *lack* of any mention of a peace before c. 450) unquestioningly accepted by traditional scholarship, against the testimony of the fourth-century authors, at least some of whom seem to have seen an actual document. Let us examine the witnesses.

That Diodorus thoroughly mixes up the Eurymedon campaign and that on Cyprus c. 450 is generally recognised. He alone connects the Eurymedon victory with an invasion of Cyprus; and Simonides' epigram on the victory of Cyprian Salamis is transferred to that imaginary campaign (xi 61–62), and the victory is ascribed to Cimon, who was in fact dead by the time it was won. As for Aristodemus, whose date we cannot even reliably conjecture, Jacoby, in his very brief discussion, characterizes him as unreliable in chronology, even though Jacoby never thought of questioning that particular specimen of it in his own account.<sup>29</sup>

One reason given for belief in the date thus transmitted is that Diodorus, here as elsewhere, is closely following Ephorus (see most recently Meister), and that Ephorus himself therefore did not refer to a peace after Eurymedon and, in this instance, should be believed. This is not a valid reason. If Diodorus is closely following Ephorus, then Ephorus himself was already guilty of the multiple confusions between the campaign of Eurymedon and that of c. 450 in Cyprus that are demonstrable in Diodorus. If so, the only conclusion would be that these errors were already old (fourth-century and not first-)—not that they were not errors. The date found in such a context would be no more acceptable than the story of the actual events. Oddly enough, the ascription of the confusion to Ephorus has not deterred scholars (Meister is an honourable exception) from accepting the date while rejecting the rest, at least in the form in which it is presented.

I should think it unlikely even on general grounds that Ephorus should be saddled with the blame for what we find in Diodorus. He was writing in the fourth century, quite probably even in Athens, at a time when (as we noted) there was an inscription on view which those who saw it (and those who followed their account) agreed in taking to refer the peace to the period after Eurymedon—no doubt for some reason in the actual text (I have suggested an archon date). Now, historians might choose to reject the consensus, as is reported of Theopompus and Callisthenes (see below). But Ephorus is not reported to have done so, and in view of his record it is unlikely that he did; it is even more unlikely that he would accept the contents of the peace from the consensus and reject the date: historians of the fourth century BC did not practice the methods of their modern successors, accepting or rejecting parts of a source according to personal preference. And as everyone who has used Diodorus must know, he is quite capable of causing his own chronological confusions, even where Ephorus cannot be blamed.

There is a more specific argument for encouraging belief that Ephorus got the story of Callias' missions right. As we have seen, there are in fact only three sources that mention a peace negotiated by Callias after the Cyprian campaign. It has often been thought that they all derive from Ephorus, and this could be used to support the view that Ephorus rejected the fourth-century consensus. However, the story is not as simple as that. Diodorus and Aristodemus

<sup>29</sup> Jacoby, *FGrH* iic p. 320: 'Irrtümer und Verschiebungen sind ebenso häufig, wie in den späteren Chroniken, Daten fehlen ganz, und der Autor hat offenbar nur eine sehr dunkle Vorstellung von der

chronologie.' As for his date, Jacoby's 'in späthellenischer und römischer Zeit' (*ibid.* 319) is still all that can be said.

certainly do not mention an earlier peace, and Aristodemus (F12–13) not only shares Diodorus' omission but improves on it, making the Cyprian campaign and Cimon's death follow at once (εὐθύς) on the battle of Oenophyta and managing to omit Eurymedon altogether. (It is not likely that Ephorus should be blamed for this!) But the case of the *Suda* entry is both more complex and more interesting. Let us quote the relevant part of the text:

Καλλίας ὁ Λακκόπλουτος ἐπικληθεὶς στρατηγῶν πρὸς Ἀρταξέρξην τοὺς ἐπὶ Κίμωνος τῶν σπονδῶν ἐβεβαίωσεν ὄρους.

We cannot be sure what this is intended to mean. It may be taken to say that Callias fought as general against Artaxerxes and thus secured the boundaries fixed in Cimon's day. That would not be the only confusion found in the *Suda*. Yet even in that case, most of the conclusions we are going to draw from the passage would still apply, although the error would have to be eliminated. But it is perhaps better to give the compiler the benefit of the doubt, since it is not actually necessary to assume confusion. We are entitled (and we therefore probably ought) to translate: 'Callias . . . , while general, secured toward Artaxerxes the boundaries fixed in the treaty of Cimon's day.' I.e., we should take the passage as referring to a negotiated renewal, while attesting Callias as general. But whatever he meant, there is no doubt that the compiler knew of a peace made in Cimon's day, which was now somehow renewed or secured. He gives the peace in full s.v. 'Κίμων' 1620 (A), assigning it to Cimon and giving the date after Eurymedon and the terms essentially as known from the fourth-century sources. On the other hand, his statement regarding Callias is closely related to that of Aristodemus, who, precisely after Cimon's death and the naval victory, has Callias (whom he alone, with the *Suda*, here calls Laccoplutus) elected general and then swearing a peace with Artaxerxes 'and the rest of the Persians'. The coincidences in these two accounts cannot be accidental. They certainly demand the second interpretation of the *Suda* passage (of a renewal of peace, not of a campaign) advanced above, and they demonstrate that these two authors go back to the same source. It follows, almost beyond refutation, that Aristodemus' source also knew of a peace sworn after the battle of the Eurymedon, which Callias, as general, later renewed: in Aristodemus, the peace has simply disappeared together with the battle itself.

Who can this source be? The question is not too difficult to answer. As we have seen, Diodorus is the only surviving author, in addition to the *Suda* and Aristodemus, who reports a peace after Cimon's death and the battle off Cyprus (which he puts before Cimon's death), and Callias as negotiating it. As usual, Diodorus has been selective and has omitted what seemed unimportant to him (e.g. the nickname and rank of Callias); and the confusion over 'Cimon's' victory is surely his own (by an easy piece of mythopoeia). Yet the coincidence in date, in the name of the negotiator, and in the actual terms (at least in outline), makes it possible to deduce that his report comes from the same source as the other two. It can only be Ephorus, therefore, long known as a likely source for Aristodemus<sup>30</sup> and an almost certain one (for Greek affairs) for Diodorus. The general probability that Ephorus did not omit the peace after Eurymedon is thus confirmed by detailed analysis.

Surprisingly but demonstrably, the *Suda* is the only source that seems to have transmitted his account correctly: a treaty under Cimon (as in the other fourth-century sources), renewed by Callias after Cimon's death, and presumably (it would follow) broken in the interim. Aristodemus lost the first treaty together with the battle preceding it. The error is perhaps not too surprising, in a work as brief as his, yet we must ask: how could one of the best-known Athenian victories simply disappear? We can now see an answer: if Aristodemus, reading Ephorus, came across a record of two naval victories, each followed by a peace negotiated by Callias, he might well drop the first sequence—whether because he thought it must have been inserted by mistake or (more probably) because it was clear that that victory was not decisive and

<sup>30</sup> See Jacoby, *l.c.*: 'daß auch Ephoros zu den grundquellen gehört, ist an sich wahrscheinlich und scheint durch die oft starke übereinstimmung mit Diodor und Justin bestätigt zu werden.'



the peace not lasting (hence unimportant for his epitome). The case of Diodorus is similar, though his solution was not as clean and neat. His puzzlement must have been equal, the more so if he really thought that Cimon had won both the victories. And although writing on a far larger scale than Aristodemus, and unwilling to omit an outstandingly glorious Greek victory over the King, he could certainly omit a peace which was soon followed by renewed fighting, to concentrate on a later one that lasted for a whole generation. Unfortunately Diodorus was given to being puzzled by historical duplication: the showpiece in the genre is his amalgamation of two Persian campaigns against Egypt in the fourth century, the first a disastrous failure and the second a complete success (xvi 40 ff.). But for our detailed contemporary documentation, no one would have been able to work out the true sequence in that instance, and few scholars would have had the courage to suggest what we know to be the truth. In any case, Diodorus seems to have been as confused by his notes on this sequence as Aristodemus possibly was by Ephorus himself, and the larger scale of his account makes the confusion more apparent: he not only omits the first peace (which could be justified), but he reports *both* Eurymedon *and* the Cyprian campaign, yet transposes parts of the latter into the former. The similar sequences of naval victory plus peace treaty are probably largely to blame. We must always remember that ancient writers did not normally check their sources when writing: Diodorus, like Pliny or (I think) Cassius Dio, presumably worked from notes made from the text of his sources; in case of difficulty, he would smooth things over as best he could, without going back to his source.

The upshot of this discussion is that what must surely be Ephorus' account—that there were two treaties between Athens and the King, the first made by Callias just before the fall of Cimon from power and the change to an activist foreign policy that at once rejected the newly made treaty, and the second after the activist foreign policy had led to disastrous failure and Pericles had come round to his own version of a Cimonian policy, which led to Callias' reviving the peace with the King (and, in due course, making peace with Sparta as well)—fits in well with what we know of the background of Athenian politics in the middle of the fifth century and is likely to be true.<sup>31</sup> The fourth-century sources, where they date the peace, are naturally interested only in the original peace, which for the first time forced the King to make concessions: the later history of that peace is of no interest to them (they ignore the 'Peace of Epilycus', known from Andoc. iii 29, just as they ignore the renewal of 449). This by no means discredits their evidence. As to the peace of 449, there is no reason whatever, especially in the light of the explicit statement in the *Suda*, to believe that it rests on mere confusion: it must be accepted as a renewal of the original peace.

Why should Ephorus' account *not* be believed? The question of authenticity, which has been almost the only question regarding the Peace of Callias that scholars have usually discussed, is obviously a complex one. But let us start with a few arguments that can be fairly summarily dismissed.

First, and at first sight perhaps important: two fourth-century authors are attested as standing out against the consensus and denying that a peace was made. Theopompus' denial (*FGrH* 115 F 153–154) is total: the peace 'with Darius' is a lie (one of several invented by the Athenians for their greater glory), and this is clear from the fact that it was engraved in Ionian letters and not in Attic, as, in the fifth century, it ought to have been. No other argument advanced by him against the peace is cited, and we have no reason to invent others. But Theopompus, whatever his pretensions as an epigraphist, was no serious historian. His testimony to the actual existence of a stele engraved in the Ionian alphabet of the fourth

<sup>31</sup> A minor consequence is that Callias should be allowed his *strategia*, which has apparently not gained recognition from modern scholars. Thus Davies (*APF* 259) says that he was never a *strategos* and Fornara (n. 15) does not list him. Meiggs, in his selection of sources on the Peace of Callias (*Ath. Emp.* 487 f.), extracts the 'sea limits' from Aristodemus, but perversely omits the reference to Callias' *strategia*. Yet there is little reason to

doubt it and none to ignore it. Cimon's brother-in-law may well have served with him on Cyprus, or possibly on the expedition that went to Egypt. It was not uncommon for generals to go on important diplomatic missions in time of war; thus, e.g., Xanthippus (480/79), Aristides (479/8), Nicias, Nicostratus and Autocles (424/3), Alcibiades (418/7).

century is important, as confirming what Isocrates and probably others saw. But the stele was not meant to deceive: it was a re-engraving of an original that cannot possibly have survived the events of 411–403 BC: the two oligarchies, the actual collapse of the treaty (with the King becoming Athens' most powerful enemy), and the defeat of Athens. This was seen by Meiggs (*Ath. Emp.* 138), though he undermined the case by making it only one of three 'possibilities', not all equally plausible. It makes the frequently advanced 'explanation'—that Theopompus may have seen the Peace of Epilycus, and that this (c. 420) may well have been engraved in Ionian letters—superfluous. Whichever peace ('with Darius') Theopompus saw, it was one of a series of fifth-century documents destroyed during the Peloponnesian war and re-engraved when they became important in the fourth.<sup>32</sup> The Peace with the King became important after the very different peace made by the Spartans, and was re-engraved at that time: it is not surprising that we first hear of it in the 380s.

The other author denying (strictly speaking) only the peace made under Cimon's predominance (Plut. *Cimon* 13) is Callisthenes. *Why* he did so, we cannot tell; but since his denial (as far as we can judge from Plutarch's citation) concerned only the peace made after Eurymedon, it is easiest to suggest that he (like some modern scholars and, as we have seen, perhaps Diodorus and Aristodemus) was struck by the fact that fighting between the two powers was soon resumed, and, knowing little about the political history of Athens, thought that the first reported peace was due to confusion with the later, well-supported one. At any rate, his suggestion of a *de facto* peace lasting a few years and due simply to the King's weakness and inability to meet Athenian forces should not be misused as support for the absurd modern construct of a *de facto* peace lasting for nearly half a century. It is not implausible in itself, but in view of Plutarch's failure to tell us Callisthenes' reasons (if indeed he advanced any), we have no good excuse for preferring his statement to that of the majority of fourth-century authors, partially supported as it is by Herodotus' report of Callias' embassy to Susa.

We have already seen that Herodotus' failure to mention the conclusion of the peace is entirely explicable in terms of the nature and purpose of his work. (The peace as such, of course, lies beyond the limits of his history and would not appear within its chronological framework.) The silence of Thucydides has seemed more of an obstacle and cannot be fully explained. But we must bear in mind that we are equally unable to give a satisfactory explanation of other silences and near-silences of his. Thus the 'Peace of Epilycus' is well attested (see p. 17 above). Yet Thucydides ignores it; indeed, that fact has been used by some as confirmation of the Peace of Callias, since (it is urged) he could not have omitted a peace between Athens and the King made during the period covered by his full *History* unless it was a mere technicality: a renewal of an earlier peace—which he did not report because he covered the *Pentecontaetia* very selectively. It is clear that this is rather an odd argument. But the fact that he did not report the Peace, nor (e.g.) Athenian support for Amorges, which Andocides (*ibid.*) rightly thinks a crucial event in bringing about the King's hostility to Athens, shows the nature and scale of his selective omissions, even during the Peloponnesian War. As for the *Pentecontaetia*, his omissions can be explained as due partly to his selecting material to support his thesis as to the causes of the War, and partly to his desire to conceal the extent of Athens' (and Pericles' personal) responsibility for it. Thus the Thirty Years' Peace (surely one of the most important items of information, had he wanted to give his reader the essential facts as modern historians do) is reported without any details as to its provisions—details that become important in the negotiations preceding the outbreak of war and that he must certainly have been able to see, since even Pausanias still saw them on a stele at Olympia (v 23.4) and can cite a minor provision concerning Argos—except for the simple territorial clauses. And he tells us nothing about the passing of the Megarian decree(s)—certainly not Pericles' personal responsibility in this case—although he notes the crucial importance of this during the negotiations (i 139.1; cf. 140.4). He does not mention, among many other matters, the transfer of the Delian treasury to Athens or the organisation of the Athenian Empire, which a modern historian would again think essential towards an understanding of the War that is his main theme. It should be an accepted principle that the silence of an ancient author, whether Thucydides or (say) Diodorus, cannot be used as a negative argument, whatever the conventional degree of modern respect for that author.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *IG* ii/iii<sup>2</sup> 1, nos. 1, 6, 8, 9, 12; i<sup>3</sup> 227–9 (227 with M. B. Walbank, *ZPE* li [1983] 183 f.). Reengraving was independently suggested by S. K. Eddy, *CP* lxxv (1970) 13; but he quaintly described it as a 'sentimental'

act after the end of the war. Recognition of the need to reengrave fortunately renders discussion of various hypotheses as to what Theopompus might have seen otiose.

Finally, an argument frequently advanced in this discussion (see Meister 35 f.), which has been dragged into it by modern misinterpretation, needs detailed discussion, but can (I hope) be decisively banished from it for the future. It is the argument from the reported debate in Athens over the use for Athenian purposes of the funds contributed by the Allies.<sup>33</sup> I agree with Meister, as against what scholars like Andrewes have suggested (*JHS* xcvi [1978] 2 ff.), that the account of the debate in Plutarch (*Per.* 12) must go back to contemporary sources and should be taken seriously: we cannot assert the authenticity of the Peace of Callias by denying the authenticity of this debate. According to Meiggs (*Ath. Emp.* 491), it was Busolt (whom he praises for it) who first noticed the difficulty allegedly posed by what Pericles is reported to have pointed out to the Athenians. The crucial phrase (s. 3) must be quoted:

ὅτι χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ ὀφείλουσι τοῖς συμμάχοις λόγον, προπολεμοῦντες αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀνείργοντες.

The first question must be: when did this debate take place? Meiggs, accepting the complex argument fully set out in *The Athenian Tribute Lists* iii, which is based on interlocking interpretations of various sources, chief of them the scholia known as *Anonymus Argentinensis*, believes that the building policy was initiated in 450/49 (*Ath. Emp.* 132 f., 139 f.). The argument on which this date depends cannot be examined here. But if it is accepted, there is no difficulty whatsoever about this passage: it is only Meiggs's peculiar time-table of events around 450, chiefly due to his desire to justify an adapted version of the explanation of the 'missing tribute list' given in *ATL*, that forces him to deny that Athenian forces were at that very time fighting the Persians in Cyprus and Egypt. (See the Appendix below.)

If the reconstruction based on the *ATL* interpretation of the *Anonymus Argentinensis* is rejected, then the debate should belong to the time (c. 447) when work on the Parthenon actually began. But even at this point the phrase used by Pericles causes no difficulty for anyone who believes in the authenticity of the (renewed) Peace of Callias. It must be noted that the participle προπολεμοῦντες can refer to the past just as easily as to the present. It is surprising that this simple and well-known Greek idiom<sup>34</sup> has never been noted by the scholars who have worried over this passage. If Plutarch intended his Pericles to say that the Athenians 'had been fighting' (as distinct from 'had fought') on behalf of their allies, there was probably no other way in which he could have expressed this. The debate over the use of League funds, no matter when we choose to set it, is thus irrelevant to the question of whether and when peace was made between Athens and the King.

## VI

Meister (pp. 32–38) lists fifteen different points arising out of relations between Athens and Persia after c. 465, which on his view establish the fact that there cannot have been a peace after Eurymedon. He courteously refers to my view (informally communicated to him long after his monograph was in type) that peace was made on two occasions, with a renewal of war between them, but he misunderstands me as claiming (like some others) that the peace was frequently violated and 'letztlich nur ein Stück Papier geblieben sei' (32 n. 62). I hope he will see that this was far from what I had in mind. But what must be said here is that, once it is admitted that my hypothesis may be essentially correct, five out of his first six points become irrelevant to the issue of authenticity. Since most of them have already been covered in this discussion, only a reminder will be needed.

Points 2 and 3 (the expeditions of Pericles and Ephialtes) are, as we have seen, irrelevant to any date

<sup>33</sup> A. R. Hands (*Mnemosyne* xxviii [1979] 194–5) was right in his explanation of the article in τὸν πόλεμον, but failed to notice the simple grammatical explanation of

the tense. His own explanation may cause confusion and is not helpful.

<sup>34</sup> See Kühner-Gerth ii 1, p. 200, with numerous examples, some quite striking.

and to any reasonable formulation of the terms of the peace our sources report; except that the commanders' failure to bring back any actual booty from the King's territory must be regarded as significant support for the existence of a formal agreement.<sup>35</sup> Points 4–6 comprise the expeditions against Cyprus and Egypt in 461/60 and against Cyprus in 450. (It is surprising that the expedition against Egypt on that occasion, mentioned both by Thucydides i 112.3 and in Plutarch, *Cimon* 18, has escaped Meister's careful search.) We have seen that those expeditions, far from being evidence against the existence of a treaty concluded under Cimon's auspices, fit well into the context of Athenian politics in those years on the basis of the existence of such a treaty.

The first of Meister's points is more impressive. It concerns the cities given to Themistocles by the King, and thus brings us back to the story of Themistocles, which we have already found to be crucial to interpretation of the *Pentecontaetia* in another respect. He was given Magnesia, Lampsacus and Myous as the sources of his income (Thuc. i 138.5), to befit his status as a Persian grandee. The connection with the first two is attested, and the story must be believed. According to Meister, this gift could not have been made, if there had been peace between Athens and the King so that he could not dispose of Athens' subjects.

Now, we do not know when these gifts were made. Both Thucydides and the parallel tradition imply a long stay at Susa for Themistocles. (It would be interesting to know if he was there when Callias arrived.) Nor need we assume that all the cities were given at the same time. At Susa he would be maintained as the King's guest, and any time before his own death (probably 459) is possible. Magnesia he probably received at once; as we have seen, he probably found shelter there after his arrival in Asia, and a strong connection continued: he died and (at least originally) was buried there. Magnesia, like its homonym on Sipylus, was never under Athenian authority. It yielded him fifty talents a year, and a man could live in some state on that. The other two were presumably added after Athens renewed the war, at a time when (as our tradition agrees) his advice was more than ever sought by the King. The slender evidence that he remitted the tribute of Lampsacus may well be believed: with Magnesia's fifty talents, he hardly needed it. As for Myous, we know nothing: it was too small to attract any notice.<sup>36</sup> In any case: scrutiny of the cities received by Themistocles yields no argument against the authenticity of the Peace of Callias.

## VII

We must now survey the series of incidents in which Athenian and Persian forces appear to come (or to be about to come) into conflict. Most scholars have accepted some of them as reconcilable with a peace. But for Meister they are among the strongest arguments against it. First, a few general points must be made: such discussion needs a general framework.

First, and probably most important: if we assume (at least for the sake of argument) that there was a peace, we do not have its actual terms. We have only summaries in later literary sources, concerned not with transmitting facts, but with stressing Athenian glory, and at times demonstrably inaccurate. The fact that the few terms we have (mostly concerning geography

<sup>35</sup> See p. 10 above.

<sup>36</sup> For the flight to Asia see Podlecki (n. 10). Davies (*APF* 215) carefully sifted the complex tradition on the date of death, in the end cautiously accepting 459. On Magnesia see *ATL* iv s.v. and Podlecki 107 f. For Themistocles and Lampsacus see the honours for his son Cleophantus, discussed *ATL* iii 111 ff.: a claim inherited from his father is implied, and the latter's generosity seems to be confirmed by implication. The reference in Themistocles' pseudepigraphical letter (cited *ATL*) may well have been spun out of a local record. That Lampsacus and Myous were not in the King's possession

when he gave them to Themistocles (suggested *ATL*, and similarly Gomme, *HCT* i 292: 'empty show') is an odd suggestion: it would hardly confirm his loyalty at a critical time. The cities are said to have been given him for bread, wine and ὄψον (= fish?). It is interesting to compare the rations dispensed 'on behalf of the King' and royal personages in R. T. Hallock, *Persepolis fortification tablets* (Chicago 1969) 214 ff. ('J texts'): they consist of food animals; grain or flour or bread; and wine (oil appears once). Fish would no doubt be substituted for a Greek more used to it than to meat.

and taxation) are recorded with some diversity has—quite erroneously—been used as ammunition by those who deny the existence of a peace. The inadequacy of the literary record concerning treaties is a commonplace of modern scholarship and should not be suppressed in order to provide facile arguments.<sup>37</sup> Let us take the very genuine Thirty Years' Peace, one of the most important treaties of the fifth century. We have already alluded (p. 18 above) to Thucydides' very selective and unsatisfactory treatment of it, even though an authentic document was there, for him and others to see. Some of the provisions that turn out to be most important for the *Kriegsschuldfrage* of the Peloponnesian War can at best be deduced from later allusions, sometimes not even that with real certainty: his principal treatment of the peace gives only the territorial clauses. The clause providing for compulsory arbitration of differences only becomes known when the Athenian ambassadors at Sparta mention it at the very end of their speech there (i 78.4). The Spartans, oddly enough, are never depicted as openly acknowledging its existence—not even Archidamus, who opposes hasty action, but who refers to arbitration only as general custom, not as mandatory in this instance (85.2). No one really knows on what precise grounds Megara claimed that the Athenian measures against her were contrary to the peace: much as some scholars dislike admitting it, we cannot say what justification the Megarians had for their claim, since Thucydides, undoubtedly for purposes of his own, chooses not to tell us, giving us only Pericles' denial (144.2). Nor do we know precisely what the peace stipulated about autonomy, though it can be shown with considerable probability that a general autonomy clause of some kind—not merely a special one for Aegina, as has often been argued from the fact of Aegina's complaint (67.1)—must be assumed.<sup>38</sup>

Diodorus (xii 7) is no improvement on Thucydides: although he gives us the names of two of the men who swore to the peace (not telling us whether they were Athenians or Spartans, which in one case we do not know), he gives us none of the actual terms at all. The one term cited by Pausanias (v 23.4) from the stele he saw at Olympia is one that we do not find in any historian and could not have deduced for ourselves. What else there was, and how important, it is absurd even to estimate. It is pure self-delusion to claim that we know.

Similarly, had we had only Diodorus (xii 74.5) on the Peace of Nicias, we could not have known that the return of Plataea and Nisaea by their respective occupiers was not provided for: scholars would (quite properly) have concluded that the failure to return them was parallel to other instances of non-fulfilment of the known territorial clauses, and (*i.a.*) Megara's motive for failing to adhere to the peace could not have been understood.

Instances could be multiplied. But these should suffice to remind us that, where we have no accurate record of a peace treaty, it is in principle impossible to decide whether it has been broken—the more so since, in our sketchy accounts of the fifth century, the events that might

<sup>37</sup> Meister (67 ff.) makes much of contradictions in the literary sources on the peace terms. Meiggs (*Ath. Emp.* 146 f.) gives examples of inaccuracy in literary quotation of documents. I have noted two striking cases in the text. G. E. M. de Ste Croix (*The origins of the Peloponnesian war* [London, 1972] 293) states that he knows 'of no complete and correct account of the Thirty Years' Peace by any modern scholar' and proceeds to construct a version which he implies will remedy the deficiency. But this is pure delusion. The state of the sources is such that a complete account cannot even be attempted: the casual reference in Pausanias (see text) makes this amply clear. (For analysis of the accounts of the peace of 404, see W. E. Thompson, *Historia* xxx [1981] 175 f.)

<sup>38</sup> In addition to the standard case of Aegina, see Thuc. i 58.1 for a Spartan promise to invade Attica if Potidaea were attacked (which *prima facie* implies that Sparta would regard this as a violation of the peace), and

above all the striking example of Samos. (See i 40.5; 41.2; 43.1.) Ste Croix (citing A. H. M. Jones) correctly pointed out (*op. cit.* 200) that the story must be taken to imply that Sparta had passed the same kind of vote as later on the motion of Sthenelaidas. (He mistakenly thinks this a vote for war: in fact, it was a vote that the peace had been violated.) This implies that Samos, just like Megara, Aegina and (probably) Potidaea later, provided a *prima facie* case of Athens' having broken a clause of the peace. All these instances add up to a strong suggestion that there was a general clause stipulating the autonomy of certain cities (perhaps all those cities autonomous when the peace was concluded: see Pericles' remark at i 144.2). I have discussed these issues in two forthcoming articles. No doubt that autonomy was subject to fixed conditions in the case of cities in fact 'allied' to Athens; we should compare the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. v 18.5).

constitute a breach are themselves only imperfectly related. Such modern discussions, against a background of almost perfectly preserved evidence, as the debate on the outbreak of the war in 1914, provide a healthy antidote to optimistic interpretation in Athenian history. I shall suggest that several apparent breaches of the peace between Athens and the King were evidently not thus considered by the contracting parties, and that the appearance may go back to our ignorance of the actual terms.

The other general point to be borne in mind is one that has at times been noted. The Peace of Callias must be assumed to have been made, not because the contracting parties had come to love one another and wanted to be friendly, but because they had fought each other to a standstill and had come to think that there was more to be lost than gained by continued fighting. A peace—any peace—lasts as long as both parties agree that it should, rather like a marriage. (The Roman definition of marriage by  *affectio maritalis*  might usefully be transferred to the definition of a peace.) It is not in fact (though it is in law) broken by any actual deed, but by the determination that, in the light of the deed concerned, the peace should (or need) not be maintained. Except in extreme cases (most obviously territorial invasion), the transition from peace to war is not immediate even where that determination has been made. This important point is often misunderstood, and that has led to serious misinterpretation of (e.g.) the process leading to the formal outbreak of the Peloponnesian War; though here Thucydides is in large part also to blame, through his desire to make Sparta appear solely or largely responsible. Seen in its proper light, the complex series of steps that ended in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and that, at various stages, could easily have been halted or reversed, demonstrates the inadequacy of a view that neatly contrasts peace and war.<sup>39</sup>

Scholars working in our day and age should in any case be less puzzled by the intermediate stages between peace and war, and by unwillingness to determine that a particular act constitutes a  *casus belli* , than their predecessors in nineteenth-century  *Studierzimmer* . A collection (such as that presented by Meister) of supposed breaches of the peace, even if not due to our ignorance of the precise terms of that peace, would no more suffice to prove the non-existence of a treaty than (e.g.) such incidents as Afghanistan or Grenada can be used to prove the non-existence of the undertakings entered into by the nations concerned in their adherence to the United Nations, or of what we may call the  *Koine Eirene*  presided over by that body. It is unfortunately as difficult in our own day to see the ancient world in real terms when we come to study it as it ever was in that  *Studierzimmer* .

Fortunately we have occasional proof that an incident that has been seen by scholars as an act of war was not thus viewed by contemporary participants. This should make us more cautious in passing judgment in cases where we lack such positive attestation. The most striking of these is best approached circuitously, through another incident that is (a little less strikingly) of the same kind.

In his account of the events that precede the Samian War, Thucydides (i 115.4) mentions a  *συμμαχία*  between the exiled Samian oligarchs and the satrap Pissuthnes. This can be alleged (as by Meister) to be clear proof that the satrap was not observing a peace with Athens. However, we in fact know that no formal treaty was involved, for Thucydides says that the oligarchs also made a  *συμμαχία*  with the most powerful men at Samos, and that cannot be an international treaty. And we do not find Pissuthnes involved in any common military action with them: he merely permits the collection of 700  *epikouroi*  in his territory ('volunteers', as we might nowadays call them). After their success, he receives from them the Samian democrats and the Athenian forces and officials whom they have captured—a function that might nowadays well be performed by the International Red Cross, for we have no reason to believe that they came to any harm. (They certainly nowhere appear as hostages in the Athenian response to the rebellion.) Despite Thucydides' statement (which can hardly be wholly accurate) that the oligarchs smuggled all the hostages taken from among them by the Athenians out of Lemnos before their counterstroke, one must suspect that all or some of those hostages were in fact exchanged with the satrap's help for the prisoners entrusted to him.

<sup>39</sup> I have discussed this in detail in my forthcoming articles.

In 430, not long after the outbreak of war, we find a similar situation (Thuc. iii 34). A garrison (we do not know its composition or the precise way it came to be there) under a man Itamanes, who must be an Iranian, has been installed at Colophon; no connection with Pissuthnes is actually recorded, but it is likely enough, since at the time Thucydides picks up the story, in 427, we find *epikouroi*, both Arcadian and barbarian, explicitly brought over from his satrapy by a faction at Notion that is said to be pro-Persian. It is at this point that Paches happens to sail past, and is called in by the other faction, whom, by a treacherous attack, he manages to rid of their opponents, at least at Notion. (We hear nothing further about Colophon.) The technique is reminiscent of what we have fully attested in the Samian War; and it is to be presumed that the garrison at Colophon had got there (κατὰ στάσιμ, as Thucydides tells us) in the same way.

Meister lists these events as: 'Pissuthnes sendet . . . Soldaten nach Kolophon und greift . . . Notion an.' This implies unambiguous acts of war. Yet not only is there the case of Samos to warn against facile conclusions, but as it happens, it is in this very case of Notion that we have the clearest example of an incident of this kind which was not regarded as an act of war or a breach of any peace. For it was at this very time, just before Paches' arrival at Notion, which was then occupied by the garrison of *epikouroi*, that some anti-Athenian Ionian exiles, with real or pretended optimism, tried to persuade the Spartan Alcidas, who happened to be in the area with a fleet, to seize an Ionian city and try to bring about the rebellion of Ionia, since he had failed to save Mytilene (iii 31.1). Among other things, they said that they thought they could persuade Pissuthnes to join them in the war (πίσειν τε οἶσθαι καὶ Πισσοῦθνην ὥστε συμπολεμεῖν). This makes it abundantly clear that, after all that had happened at Colophon and Notion, not only did Pissuthnes not consider himself at war with Athens (nor Athens with him, if we may judge by Paches' omission of any hostile action against his territory), but men with the highest possible stake in hopeful exaggeration could produce nothing better than the statement that they 'thought they would persuade him' to go to war. Alcidas—who perhaps deserves more credit for good sense than Thucydides seems to give him—did not think much of their vague promises and preferred to sail home.

It is clear that it never entered Thucydides' mind that the actions at Colophon and Notion that he has been summarily describing (with interest arising only out of Paches' accidental participation) amounted to acts of war, such as Meister indicates. In fact, he shows so little interest in this and similar incidents that he gives us no clear idea of what really happened. Here, for instance, once he has finished with Paches at Notion, he tells us nothing of the consequences, except that the Athenians 'later' founded a colony at Notion, settling all the Colophonians they could find in exile in the colony. This must mean that they never did intervene at Colophon. In 428/7 (*ATL* i 317), we find the Colophonians (not specified as being at Notion) paying a small tribute, clearly much too soon for it to come from the colony 'later' established there. Although guesses have been made, we simply do not know what happened.

Thucydides tells us nothing at all about a more interesting incident which we happen to pick up in Photius' summary of Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 14 [45]), and which has at least left an echo in Herodotus. It concerns a member of the highest Persian aristocracy, Zopyrus son of Megabyxus, who fled to Athens (on which his mother, we hear, had bestowed benefits) and was killed trying to win Caunus for the Athenians. His death was avenged by his grandmother Amestris. Herodotus (iii 160) mentions the flight to Athens *obiter*, but says nothing about Caunus. This makes it likely (though not certain) that Zopyrus was living in Athens at the time and that the Caunus incident had not yet occurred. The summary of Ctesias, unfortunately, gives no indication of how long he lived there. But the Caunus affair, at least, can be dated with reasonable confidence, and Thucydides does not come out of it too well. Had it happened in the *Pentecontaetia*, it might not have been important enough to mention. But as has been worked out from the tribute record of Caunus, there is no room for the revolt except in the early twenties; and that fits in both with Herodotus' silence regarding it and with the fact that in Ctesias it appears to be the last item before the death of Amestris and of Artaxerxes himself; and this last event can be dated, from Thucydides and from Mesopotamian documents, to early 424.<sup>40</sup> As for Zopyrus' flight to Athens, from what we can work out regarding the complex story of revolt and pardon spun around Megabyxus, it cannot easily be put before 440.<sup>41</sup> But it was clearly years after his arrival that the revolt of Caunus

<sup>40</sup> See Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* 70 ff., superseding Parker and Dubberstein.

<sup>41</sup> The chronology of Megabyxus is not easy to disengage from Photius' summary of Ctesias, which is almost the only evidence we have. (See *FGrH* 688 F 14.) Lewis (*op. cit.* 51 n. 5) tries to argue from Nehemiah that the revolt of Megabyxus in Syria was over by 445, but

he (quite properly) does not express any great confidence in his argument: as he says, other scholars have expressed the opposite opinion on the basis of the same evidence. But it seems certain that Megabyxus must have lived more than five years (probably considerably more) after the end of the revolt, if all that follows is to be fitted in (*Ctes. l.c.* sections 39–41).

offered him an opportunity to make himself useful to his hosts. In the actual rebellion, there is no mention of Persians. We do not hear of satrapal power or intervention, indeed not even of a garrison (though it would be rash to deny that there may have been *epikouroi* in the city). We hear only of citizens. The only reference to Persian interest comes when the killer of Zopyrus is cruelly executed at Amestris' orders. The simplest explanation is that, since Zopyrus was a rebel, his killer could be lured to Susa by promises of reward. As for Thucydides; although there is no satisfactory excuse for his ignoring the story, the fact that he does so at least clearly documents that he did not regard it as important for the war as such: there was no question of a Persian attack on Athenian interests.<sup>42</sup>

So much for supposed Persian acts of aggression. On the Athenian side the showpiece is Pericles' action in the Pontic area (Plut. *Per.* 20), which led to the colonisation of Sinope and probably of Amisus.<sup>43</sup> The date has been variously conjectured, since Plutarch does not write chronologically. But he certainly puts the story into a context of events after Cimon's death, and it looks as if he meant it to be thus understood. Various possibilities have been suggested. One that might be added, perhaps, is a connection with the Samian War. Thucydides, in one of his customary silences, never informs us of the precise settlement of the revolt of Byzantium or of its date, although he well knew its importance for the vital Athenian corn route. The revolt had exposed the vulnerability of that route, and it must itself be seen against a background of attested unrest and instability in the whole area. What is clear is that the satrap at Dascylium was not exercising any effective authority there, and a demonstration of Athenian power was urgently needed, even though it seems that the King counted the area among his dominions, as he did others over which he had no real control. We find a Cappadocian tyrant at Amisus, a Greek tyrant at Sinope, Bithynian attacks even on Propontic Astacus (an ally of Athens), and a war between Heraclea and her neighbours that went on for some time.<sup>44</sup> The revolt of Byzantium (however and whenever it was settled) must have brought the dangers into focus for any Athenian leader.

It was the unsettled state of affairs that accounts for Pericles' expedition. I see no doubt that Pericles was here technically intervening on territory claimed by the King. But the King had no control, indeed he had lost it long ago. Plutarch contrasts the account of the Pontic expedition with a very different area: he matches it with Pericles' opposition to the attempts of Athenian hotheads to intervene in Egypt. That would have been at the heart of the King's concern, as was well known; war with the King would have been certain as a result of intervention. Even more significantly, Plutarch stresses that Pericles opposed any idea of attacks on the coasts of the King's lands.

There seems to be a pattern, closely corresponding on both sides. First, there is the fact, noted especially by Eddy, that both sides try to avoid a major war, since both knew they would not profit from it. Hence, certainly, Pericles' refusal to get involved in Egypt, despite the (at least) local successes by rebel leaders, clear from the large gift of wheat by 'King Psammetichus'

<sup>42</sup> The fictions spun in *RE* s.v. 'Zopyros 2' should be ignored. The author adduces no serious evidence for his reconstruction. Photius' summary does not specify the great benefit conferred on Athens by Zopyrus' mother, which gave him confidence in a friendly reception there when he decided to flee. *RE* suggests that it was an offering, as by a Hellenistic queen, in an Athenian temple. But that seems wholly inadequate and would not lead to long-surviving gratitude. It may be suggested that she prevailed upon her husband to have some of the Athenian prisoners released, or at least saved from death, after he captured them in Egypt. (Cf. the story in Ctesias, *l.c.* sections 39–40.) That was a benefit of which Athenians could be reminded. For the chronology of the revolt of Caunus, see S. K. Eddy, *CP* lxxviii (1973) 255 f.—an article which can be read with considerable profit, even though he is too ready (like Meister after him) to see Persian aggression where none is attested. (See, e.g., pp. 250, 254.)

<sup>43</sup> Amisus is not connected with this in the sources. See *ATL* iii 116.

<sup>44</sup> See S. M. Burstein, *Outpost of Hellenism* (Berkeley 1976) 28 ff. He assembles (27 f.) the evidence for the

status of the south Pontic cities: probably autonomous and certainly at one time under the King, which would mean that he maintained his claim. Astacus: *ATL* i 471 f. Diod. xii 34.5 (435/4) can be emended, in a context that demonstrably needs emendation of other names, so as to refer to a colony there. *ATL* iii 116 regards Lamachus' 'adventure at Heracleia in 424 (Thuc. iv 75.2)' as involving an attempt to collect money in the King's territory within the Black Sea, hence as contrary to the peace. This seems to be fiction. What Thucydides tells us is that, while two other generals were engaged in their legitimate business (including the collection of tribute) in the Hellespont area, Lamachus 'had sailed into the Black Sea with ten ships' and, after seeking refuge from a storm (so it seems) in a harbour belonging to Heraclea, lost his ships and had to return overland. The purpose of his mission is not stated, but it can easily be conjectured as being support for Heraclea and Amisus, not long after Pericles' intervention there. Thucydides, at any rate, makes no mention of any collection of tribute outside the Athenian *arche*. As we have seen, sailing into the Black Sea is nowhere stated to have been contrary to the terms of the peace.



(Philoch. *FGH* 328 F 119), which implies both control over a large wheat-growing area (presumably in the Delta) and a plea for support, probably leading to the debate reported by Plutarch.

However, what slender evidence we have noted suggests rather more.<sup>45</sup> There is no documented case of an attack by either side on territory actually held by the other. (In Egypt, of course, whatever the success achieved by rebels, it is clear that the King never came near losing total control, as he did for two generations in the fourth century.) The fact that Pissuthnes, in the cases of Colophon and Notion, was not considered by anyone (with the possible exception of an interested faction at Notion) to be waging war against Athens cannot be wholly due to the fact that Athens did not want to fight him. In the case of Samos, we actually see him taking care, while allowing those with whom he sympathized to help themselves to support, to avoid intervening himself. He did not attack a government allied with Athens. Similarly, Pericles' Pontic intervention was not directed at any subject of the King under his control, and we have seen that he resisted calls to attack the King's coastline. The peace must certainly, like most such treaties in antiquity, have prohibited attacks by either party against allies and subjects of the other. It can be taken for granted that there would be no detailed schedule of the territories concerned—a conjecture improbable even in the case of the Thirty Years' Peace. The difficulties in compiling such a gazetteer, covering the King's territories from Egypt to the Pontus and the whole of the Athenian Empire in full detail, would be insuperable.

One might differ on the definition of *what* was under control, as in our own day, where legitimacy and effectiveness of rule are not always easily decided. When a city successfully rebelled, it might be taken to have left its former master's control, so that it was not covered by the peace. Fortunately, we have a pointer to the importance of this question of legitimacy in the case of Colophon. We hear (Thuc. iii 34.1), no doubt on the basis of what Paches was told by the faction that called him in, that Itamanes had been summoned ἰδίᾳ during *stasis* at Colophon; i.e., he had not come after an appeal by the legitimate government. Whether or not the *ex parte* version is true, it nicely documents the importance of the distinction. Paches was being given grounds for intervention, to legitimise his (consequential) action at Notion. He might well, on the same grounds, have gone on to Colophon itself; but that would have been a waste of time, and he was probably not strong enough.

If there was Persian aid for Caunus (which is not attested, as we saw), it would be on the same principle. Here, however, we paradoxically find the Athenians trying to use a Persian connection for their advantage: they hoped that Caunus, now without Athenian protection, would not dare to exclude a grandson of Xerxes.

Let us once more, as we end this part of our discussion, attend closely to the case of Samos, one of the best attested that we have. As we saw, Pissuthnes was careful not to give official support to the oligarchic rebels, as long as a pro-Athenian democracy was in control. He had no instructions to involve the King in war. Once the oligarchy was reestablished, however, the situation was quite different: not only was it firmly in control, but it could claim continuity with what had, until Pericles' intervention, been the legitimate and recognised government of Samos. It was now Pericles and the Athenians who were trying to reimpose a rebel government which they had imposed by force before. Pericles could claim no legitimacy for his intervention. As we have seen, it was this that led the Spartans to vote that the Thirty Years' Peace had been broken: an act that helps to impose on us the necessity of postulating a more general autonomy clause for that peace. A similar, though not precisely corresponding, decision had to be taken by the Persians, to whom the Samian government appealed for aid—apparently to the satrap of

<sup>45</sup> Hypothetical cases of Persian aggression have been found by scholars, e.g. from scrutiny of the tribute quota lists. (See Eddy [n. 42] 241 f., 248 f.) If it is hazardous to draw any firm historical conclusions from such evidence, for which we lack all background, it is plain fancy to infer rebellion supported by Persian intervention. Even in the better-documented cases

(Miletus and Erythrae), the documents do not make the sequence and precise nature of the events clear, and we certainly have no basis for judging how the question of legitimacy (of government or of intervention) might appear at the time. The case of Colophon and Notion should serve as a warning. In the end, we have to argue from the literary tradition, unsatisfactory as even that is.

Syria. The appeal was taken very seriously by Pericles (Thuc. i 116.3). It is often said that both Sparta and Persia merely considered breaking their treaties when it suited them. In the case of Sparta that can only be called manifestly absurd, given the Spartans' scrupulous attention to religion. But in the case of Persia too, such an interpretation rests on nothing more than a superficial deduction from inaccurate and demonstrably misleading reports of treaties that we find in literary sources. Sparta clearly had a *prima facie* case to put to her allies. Persia had an equally good case to consider, certainly on her own reading of the treaty as we have disengaged it. No one could now reasonably argue that the legitimate government of Samos, reestablished after its overthrow by the Athenians, was appealing to the Persians ἰδίῃ. Pericles had every reason to be worried.

Nor will it do to suggest that Samian hope for Persian assistance was unrealistic, since there was no time to build a fleet and mobilise it. The Athenian attack could be foreseen as soon as the Samian government had been reestablished, and the Persian satrap of Sardis was in the middle of those events. A fleet, unlike a Grand Army, could be built and manned in Phoenicia in a matter of a few months, just as it could in Athens when resources were available. But it was for the King to decide. Whatever the justice of the Samian cause, the King had no interest in starting a war with Athens over saving the legitimate government of Samos—just as Athens had no interest in starting a war with the King over Egypt, whatever the state of affairs there. Here and only here do we get considerations of *Realpolitik*, deciding (as we have seen) when a presumed breach of the peace might be treated as such, and when legitimate action should risk the consequence of major war. As Lewis has suggested,<sup>46</sup> a bargain seems to have been struck. The King got some of his revenues back, with the Athenians giving up large parts of Caria, only recently organized into a separate tribute district; and the Athenians got Samos. At the next regular assessment, a year after the end of the war, the Carian district was abolished.

## VIII

We are now ready to approach the final and most complex question: what *was* the Peace of Callias?<sup>47</sup> There are at least two different questions implied in this: (1) if we were to find the stele seen by our fourth-century sources, as the 'Decree of Themistocles' has been found, what could we expect to see? (2) whatever this turned out to be, how would it be related to the original text or texts? To complete the search, we must add a third question: how would the original text or texts be related to the action of concluding the peace? Answers will have to be speculative, of course, until a text is found, but speculation should at least be rational, and may be instructive.

First, there is the complication introduced by the 'Peace of Epilycus': the peace, attested only by Andocides (iii 29), which is said by that orator to have been made by his uncle (though we need not, of course, assume that Epilycus was the official leader of the embassy). I have nothing to add to the outline of the accepted interpretation of this: that the peace was a treaty concluded with Darius II, soon after his troubled accession, which (as those who accept the Peace of Callias add) renewed the Peace of Callias; and that this was particularly urgent because of recent Spartan diplomatic activity directed at Susa, of which Thucydides (for once abandoning his silence regarding Persian relations with the Greeks) informs us. Andocides tells us that the treaty made peace and friendship for all time; and there have been those who have made a good deal out of the 'addition' of the friendship clause. But caution is needed on this. We certainly have no good reason to believe Andocides, but neither is there any good reason to doubt that 'friendship' was a feature of the original terms negotiated by Callias. (We need not worry, or quibble, over its eternity.) As we have seen, the Athenians had heard of Spartan diplomatic activity and had wanted to send an embassy to Artaxerxes before he died. Their purpose will not have changed with the change of ruler in Susa. It was essential to prevent Persian support for Sparta; but there is no reason to believe that friendship had suddenly blossomed, nor does the fact that it is not positively attested for the Peace of Callias prove that it was not included. No positive cooperation between the King and Athens is attested at the end of the Archidamian War; above all, no Persian financial support, when Athens could

<sup>46</sup> *Sparta and Persia* 60 n. 70. (But it will be clear that I cannot accept his unargued assumption that the Persians had no right to support Samos.)

<sup>47</sup> This is similar to the question asked by G. L.

Cawkwell about the King's Peace in *CQ* n.s. xxxi (1981) 69 ff.; though there the evidence he found did not permit an answer.

have done with it. On the other hand, we shall see that, even were it not attested, it is difficult to conceive of any peace with the King as not including 'friendship' at any time.<sup>48</sup>

We may take it that the 'Peace of Epilycus' was a renewal of the Peace of Callias. The hypothesis that it was a record of that peace which Theopompus saw (in 'Ionian letters') and rejected has turned out implausible (pp. 17–18 above): what he saw must have been a fourth-century reengraving, made soon after the King's Peace. Whether it was a copy of the earlier peace (which, as far as we can see, need not have differed in any respect from the later), we cannot know. Perhaps both were in fact mentioned. We can at any rate be certain that the fourth-century document would not be an archivally accurate reproduction. The 'Decree of Themistocles' has shown us what we might expect to find: an adapted copy, with at least a modernised prescript, perhaps (like the Themistocles stele) stating a purpose and perhaps giving an archon date. That it claimed to give the terms agreed ἐνὶ Κίμωνος is surely clear from the fact that the fourth-century sources refer to that peace. However, the renovated prescript might well refer also to the renewal of Epilycus: as we shall see, that is suggested by Theopompus' comment, and it need not surprise us.

Before we try to recover and to evaluate some of the features of the original document, we must first deal with the most difficult technical question of all: whatever the text said, how had it been arrived at and what actions, by both the contracting parties, led to its setting up? This problem is perhaps the only one that might lead us to doubt the possibility that such a peace existed; yet it has not usually had much attention.

More than twenty years ago, in a few incisive pages in *Museum Helveticum* (xx [1963] 230 ff.), the Swiss scholar V. Martin pointed out that the King cannot be imagined as swearing an oath, on equal terms, to a Greek city. He can send down an edict setting out his terms, as they 'seem just' to him: indeed, this is the formal structure of the King's Peace, on the Persian side, as reported by Xenophon (*Hell.* v 1.31): βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον. There have been scholars who have disbelieved it, and who have preferred to believe that the King swore to the Peace, distrusting Xenophon and accepting an assertion in a solitary Athenian inscription.<sup>49</sup> But we must again beware of the *Studierzimmer*. The scene has only to be envisaged, for its absurdity to be patent: Athenian (or, for that matter, Spartan) ὀρκωταί arriving at Susa and, after admission to the August Presence, where they would perform the *proskynesis* on which we know the King insisted, intoning for repetition by the Vicar of Ahura Mazda and Hater of the Lie the formula calling his god's curse upon himself and his country if he should break his oath. . . . How could the King of kings, King of the countries of all races (as the official title has it), submit to this? Nor would much be saved by the speculation that he would empower someone else (totally unattested and beyond our ability to specify) to take the oath on his behalf. It is best to admit that inscriptions, even contemporary ones, are not the vehicles of divine revelation. Like historical accounts, they are written by men of flesh and blood, who are no less likely than a historian to be mistaken; especially where (as is the case of Xenophon and the Persians) the historian concerned is very familiar with the society about which he is writing, while the composer of the document must inevitably see it all as a world of faery.

We now know that Xenophon's account is here fully supported by the Persian sources, demonstrating the King's concern precisely with justice, in the image he presents to his subjects.

<sup>48</sup> On this see p. 36 below. On the 'Peace of Epilycus' see Andoc. iii 29. Mattingly's attempt (*Historia* xiv [1965] 273 ff.) to make this peace into the 'true' Peace of Callias by changing the identification of Callias as the son of Hipponicus, surnamed *Laccoplutus*, which we see the sources provide, to one with a *bouleutes* of the right year is an ingenious fantasy. Admittedly, the name is common in Athens; but the Callias reported at Susa by Herodotus and again by the Ephorus tradition cannot be simply turned into another man a generation later. A. Blamire, *Phoenix* xxix (1975) 21–6, following other scholars, accepts Andocides' statement as to the nature

of the treaty and elaborates at length. (Thus, it seems, also Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* 76 f.) For the nature of Andocides' evidence see A. Andrewes, *Historia* x (1961) 2 f. For the embassy to Artaxerxes see Thuc. iv 50. The precise chronology of the 'Peace of Epilycus' is fortunately not relevant here. (See Blamire on this.) See also *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 227, with M. B. Walbank, *ZPE* li (1983) 183–4.

<sup>49</sup> Tod, *GHI* ii 118. From this it has been restored in other texts—whether correctly is historically insignificant.

The second inscription on Darius' tomb at Naqsh i-Rustam devotes the first half of the text (the whole of the 'moral' section) to precisely the King's justice. (The second half, down to the final allocution to the subject reading it, is devoted to the King's physical prowess.) That text can now be paralleled (but for the allocution) in an almost *verbatim* copy that stood in Xerxes' name, found at Persepolis some years ago. It has turned out to be another in the series of tralatician Achaemenid texts, and it is no doubt mere accident that we have not recovered a copy set up by Artaxerxes I.<sup>50</sup> The Peace of Callias, like the King's Peace, must in some way have rested on an edict setting out what the King thought 'just'.

In the case of the Peace of Callias (i.e., the renewal of it, where we have at least a reasonably detailed report in Diodorus), the problem of the King's oath should never have arisen: no source reports the King as swearing to anything. However, several of the fourth-century sources report that it was a treaty πρὸς βασιλέα, and it can be gathered from Plutarch's account (*Cim.* 13) that this was what appeared on Craterus' copy. We must take it that it stood in the fourth-century prescript. It may even have been specified that the treaty was made with King Darius (which would apply to the renewal by Epilycus—whether or not the King originally concerned was mentioned); for it is a treaty with Darius that Theopompus saw and disbelieved.<sup>51</sup> As far as ordinary Athenians were concerned, that would in any case not be far wrong: a treaty made, by whoever it might be, 'regarding the affairs of the King' might well be described, and thought of, as a treaty made *with* the King. We must not be unreasonable in our expectations of accuracy, when Persian diplomatic formulae are interpreted for, and by, the Athenian People, as we have seen in the case of the reference to the King's oath.

As it happens, at least some of that diplomatic formulary can be recovered. The well-known and (in other connections) frequently studied treaties between various Persians and various Spartans given, although in less than perfect transcription, in Thucydides viii give precious information.<sup>52</sup> In the first of them, made with a Spartan who clearly had no experience of diplomatic language and its implications (at this date surely not unusual for a Spartan), it is provided that 'all the territory and cities held by the King and by the King's ancestors shall be the King's'; the Spartans and the King are jointly to prevent the

<sup>50</sup> The text listed in Kent, *Old Persian grammar*<sup>2</sup> (New Haven 1953) as DNb is now paralleled by what (to give it the most sensible name) should be known as XPl. See M. Mayrhofer, *Supplement zur Sammlung der altpersischen Inschriften, SAWW* cccviii (Vienna 1978) no. 4.5 (pp. 21–5).

<sup>51</sup> As we have noted, the fourth-century prescript must not be imagined to have been a *verbatim* copy of the original prescript, as it stood on whatever stele was ultimately the model for the copy. That Theopompus saw a stele giving a treaty that claimed it had been made with Darius should be believed, even though the text of the quotation is corrupt. As we have it, it reads: αἱ πρὸς βασιλέα Δαρείων Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Ἑλλήνας συνθήκαι. Some scholars have advocated the radical cure of deleting both Darius and the Hellenes, arguing that they cannot both be right and that there is no good reason to prefer one to the other. But as W. R. Connor pointed out (*Theopompus and fifth-century Athens* [Washington, D.C. 1968] 78 ff.), there was no good reason for anyone to make up the reference to Darius by name, hence there is no good reason for deleting it. In fact, I should not be surprised if at some much later date there existed a stele showing the King's Peace as made with King Darius: Arrian twice refers to it this way (ii 1.4; 2.2: see Bosworth *ad loc.*), and I think it unlikely that he made it up. It should, however, be pointed out that Pausanias (i 8.2) knew of a peace which Callias had made for the Greeks with Artaxerxes son of Xerxes. It is not impossible that the fourth-century prescript mentioned

both the original peace and its renewal under Darius: as we can see from the Themistocles stele, there was no economy of words in these documents, and Theopompus (and even less the rhetor quoting his comment) had no reason to quote what he saw in full: such pedantry would not have suited his style, or his purpose. (See Wade-Gery, *HSCP* Supplement i (1940) 127 for a different suggestion.)

The phrase regarding the Hellenes undoubtedly needs emendation or deletion. Again, Connor noted that it is difficult to see how it could be a gloss (or on what), hence how it could have been erroneously added to the text. Emendation is therefore preferable. Of the various proposals known to me, the only one worth entertaining is Jacoby's περὶ Ἑλλήνων. (Alternatively, perhaps ὑπὲρ Ἑλλήνων, frequently found in such contexts.) For the idea, see Pausanias (*l.c.*): (*Callias*) πρὸς Ἀρταξέρξην . . . τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἔπραξε τὴν εἰρήνην. Pausanias, incidentally, says that he heard this version from 'most Athenians': he does not say what the minority told him (perhaps Xerxes or Darius?).

<sup>52</sup> See Thuc. viii 18, 37, 58 for the three treaties. Even if they are not all formal international documents fully sworn to, they are (at least as drafts) fully comparable to our treaty. (My rendering preserves the reference to cities and territory.) The importance of the prescripts was noted (perhaps for the first time) by Andrewes in his commentary, in Gomme *et al.*, *Hist. Comm. on Thuc.* v (Oxford 1981) 140. But he did not make the connection here attempted.

Athenians from receiving anything from those cities and shall jointly oppose defection from the King or from the Spartans. This, before long, aroused highly adverse comment, as the implications began to sink in: it might—and by the King it would—be construed as including much of European Greece among the King's legitimate possessions, recognised and to be defended in his interest by Sparta. In the next agreement, this is considerably toned down. The Spartans still recognise the King's sovereignty over all the lands ruled by the King or by his ancestors, but they now merely agree not to attack any of those cities or to impose tribute on them: they no longer undertake to support and actually enforce the King's claim on them. This might be thought not an unreasonable compromise, if a Spartan were concerned less with language than with reality. For the verbal recognition of the King's claim, however construed, could do little practical harm, and Sparta at this point was in no position to impose tribute on any cities that had ever been under Persian rule.

However, it seems to have become clear to Spartans more concerned with the political than with the strictly military aspects of the war in Asia that the new treaty was still politically embarrassing for a power that had, both before the war and during it, been trying to build up the image of a liberator of the Hellenes. In the Ionian War, that image was as important as it ever had been. Lichas therefore refused to recognise the second treaty. At this point, Tissaphernes had had enough: not only had constant Spartan changes of mind made it impossible for him to know with whom he could deal as an official representative, but it was clearly difficult to find a compromise formula that both the Spartans and the King could accept, and discreet pressure would make the Spartans more likely to abate their pretensions. (Cf. viii 43.3; 46.) But after some time, realities (as Lewis has pointed out) had to be recognised, and a working arrangement was patched up.<sup>53</sup> We have it in the final treaty.

In the first two treaties the contracting parties had been specified as the Spartans and their allies on the one side and the King (in one case his sons are added, no doubt to imply permanence) and Tissaphernes on the other. (See viii 18.1; 37.1.) In the third, this is changed. The Spartans and their allies are still one of the parties, but the King is no longer the other: those named on the Persian side are Tissaphernes, Hieramenes and the sons of Pharnaces; and the treaty is said to be made 'concerning the affairs of the King and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies' (58.1: Thucydides here gives a fuller prescript, providing the date by Darius and by the Spartan eponymous ephor). Unfortunately we do not know enough about Persian administrative prosopography to be able to identify all of those named on the Persian side. The eldest son of Pharnaces was Pharnabazus, satrap at Dascyllium; but the text shows that he must have had at least one brother, and so far we know nothing about him. About Hieramenes we know only that he was closely related to the King (as indeed were all the eminent aristocratic houses) and that he is about this time mentioned in a so far untranslatable Lycian document.<sup>54</sup> He was clearly holding an important post in Asia Minor. The Persians named are presumably an exhaustive catalogue of senior Persian administrators who would come into contact with the Spartans. It is characteristic of our ignorance of Achaemenid administration even in this relatively well-documented area that we do not know what the Persian administrative posts there actually were at the time, let alone the persons of their incumbents. Our Greek sources mention only the satraps of Sardis and Dascyllium. But it is clear that these men must have been stationed in Asia Minor: the diplomatic formula limits the operation of the treaty to those in Asia Minor, so that explicit reference to other areas, not to mention a generalised statement of the King's claims, can be avoided. The opening clauses immediately make this clear, while preserving the King's general rights. As we have them (58.2), they read: χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστίν, βασιλέως εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται.

The first part of this is very strange. To stipulate that as much of Asia as is the King's shall be the King's is both tautologous and vacuous; it is also diplomatically inept, for it would at once concede that there was land in Asia which was not the King's. It seems inconceivable that skilled Persian negotiators, dealing with a city that depended on their financial assistance, would start by making this concession.

<sup>53</sup> For a full narrative exposition and political analysis of the treaties, see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, ch. 4. I have here taken out some points of interest for my purpose, but my formulation is not identical with his.

<sup>54</sup> Lewis (p. 104) suggests that he appears in the treaty as 'a visiting representative of the King'. This seems unlikely, both because of his mention in the Lycian text (cited by Lewis) and because we must surely

assume that the others mentioned have permanent posts in Asia Minor: indeed, in two cases we know this. Had he been a special representative, this ought to be somehow indicated, and he ought not to appear (as he does) between the regular satraps. It is best to admit that he had a position which we cannot define, owing to our ignorance of Achaemenid administration.

And not only is this the last thing we should imagine the King as allowing his representatives to swear to, but it is clear from later events that the Spartans saw no such concession in the treaty, even where it would have very much suited them to do so: in fact, they had to admit, by their own actions, that the major concession had been on their side. The case of Miletus (Thuc. viii 84.5) shows that the Greek cities could not, under the treaty, be considered to be outside the King's land. The only explanation seems to be that our text is wrong; and the fact that (as we saw) the Spartans knew perfectly well what the treaty in fact stipulated seems to show that the error is not due to the author (e.g., to his having been given a propagandist translation or revision), but is a simple textual error calling for emendation. I think we must read: χώρον [τὴν βασιλείως] ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστίν, κτλ. The claim is limited to Asia, but within Asia it is total, as indeed it always was to remain, throughout future Persian dealings with the Greeks. The second clause, however, goes on to make a general claim, *not* limited to Asia, though (obviously) immediately applicable to what has just been mentioned: the King reserves his right to rule *all* of his land without interference, even though only Asia has been specified. The concession to Spartan sensibilities (or rather, political necessities) consisted in this very fact of the absence of further specification. Even so, as we have seen, the immediate application was brutally clear, to them and to all concerned. The non-aggression clause follows, concerning (as usual) the two contracting parties; but the mutual defence clause (previously such a stumbling-block) is now limited to the two contracting parties' undertaking to oppose any attempt by anyone *from among their own ranks* to attack the other party. Absent from the second treaty (at least as we have it), perhaps because a compromise along different lines was being attempted (and proved unsuccessful), it is now reinstated in minimal and unobjectionable form: the Spartans are no longer committed to aiding the King against rebellion (e.g. by other Greeks), but merely to policing their own allies. Essentially, of course, the compromise was unsatisfactory, like (in recent times) Henry Kissinger's diplomatic formulae: it left difficulties unformulated and unresolved, in the hope that they could be settled as and when they arose, or perhaps in the wish-dream that they would never arise. Needless to say, they normally do, and what was avoided at the time of discussion as being too difficult turns out to be no easier in the heat of conflict. It could not long be forgotten or disguised that some of the King's subjects, in what he now claimed as his own unencumbered territory, were at the moment allies of Sparta. But that was for the future.

What concerns us here is that the King clearly had his rights to Asia recognised: the actual course of events forces us to correct a faulty text. Moreover, while graciously acquitting the Spartans of the need to defend him against rebellion by Greek cities under his control (e.g. Magnesia), let alone enforcing his rights in (say) Thessaly, he in no way disavowed any of his rights: he merely refrained from specifying, and demanding recognition of, the extent of his claim, as he had previously done. Nonetheless, we note the startling fact that the King and his sons can no longer personally commit themselves to a treaty even in this (as it would seem) innocuous form, diplomatically reserving all his rights; he could accept nothing short of explicit recognition of those rights. The formula patched up by Tissaphernes and his advisers (no doubt after consultation with the King by express messenger, which is why some time had to elapse before the treaty could be concluded), although it gave nothing away, was permissible only in a form that made Tissaphernes and the rest assume full and sole responsibility, dealing in their own names 'concerning the affairs of the King'.

We are fortunate to have this precise illustration of the working of Persian diplomacy in what must have been rather unusual circumstances: it shows both the flexibility of Achaemenid diplomatic categories in dealings with powerful 'barbarians' and the limits of what was considered acceptable for the King. We may dispose once and for all of the suggestion that the King can have sworn to the terms of the Peace of Callias. Since it clearly gave away (at least *de facto*) a good deal of what belonged to the King, it cannot possibly—fifty-odd years, or even thirty-odd, before the paradigmatic exposition we have just studied—have been accepted in any form by the King himself in a public document. It can only have been made by his satraps, acting (with his consent) 'concerning the affairs of the King': indeed, if this formula had been worked out long ago, that would explain how it could be got ready so quickly when the need for it arose, unexpectedly, in negotiations with the Spartans. If in the fourth-century prescript (and perhaps even in the fifth century, in a document or at least popularly) the peace was considered a peace 'with the King', that was of no interest within his dominions. The niceties of formal diplomacy

and the precise implications of its terminology were no doubt unfamiliar to the average citizen, especially in the fifth century. For all we know, the Spartans, reporting on the treaty they had concluded, may have described it in the same terms to the authorities at home.

We have already noted (p. 28 above) that our narrative (such as it is) of the peace concluded c. 449 does not refer to any personal commitment by the King. Having improved our understanding of the King's claims and diplomatic methods by study of much better evidence, we may now turn to inspection of Diodorus' account of that peace. In Diodorus xii 4, the scene is set at a time when the Athenians have not yet won a decisive victory in Cyprus. The King, after deciding to conclude peace, 'wrote to his commander and satraps around Cyprus [i.e., presumably, those taking part in the campaign on and off the island] the terms on which they might conclude a settlement with the Greeks'. The negotiations that follow and the treaty finally concluded are, in Diodorus' account, between the Athenians and 'Artabazus and Megabyzus'—apparently the commanders in Cyprus and Cilicia respectively. Callias' embassy, sent we do not hear where, is probably seen by Diodorus as going to those commanders. There is no mention of Susa. How much of this goes back to Ephorus and how much is due to compression and reconstruction, we cannot tell. Diodorus is not to be trusted in detail. It is well known that (e.g.) in the Ionian War he confuses Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes—an error not likely to be due to his source. In this case, the explicit statements—the King's orders to the commanders, and the negotiations between them and the Athenians—should no doubt be accepted. Our study of the treaties in the Ionian War has shown us that this, and its culmination in a treaty between the Athenians and the satraps, is precisely what ought to be expected. We must be grateful to find it. What must *not* be assumed to follow is what has bedevilled the whole study of the Peace of Callias: the negative consequence (which no scholar would explicitly admit) that what is in Diodorus comprises the whole truth, and that what he fails to mention did not occur.

It is at once clear, in this instance, that the names of the Persian commanders are quite likely to be correct (though, in the light of the parallel of the Ionian War, we cannot be sure), but that the list cannot be complete. Nor are they necessarily assigned to their correct posts, which surely meant nothing to Diodorus and may not have been known even to his source. We have no idea who Artabazus is; though he should probably be accepted as taking part in the war, and certainly as taking part in the treaty.<sup>55</sup> Megabyzus, however (to give him the more common form of his name), is well known, and surely in his proper place. We know him from Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 14, *ad fin.*) as (of course) a member of one of the great noble houses allied by marriage with the King (we have noted his son Zopyrus); and he was at the time satrap of Syria ('Across the River', in Persian terms). As such, he was presumably in charge of the Cilician coast. Whether he had *ex officio* responsibility for Cyprus itself, we do not know. Indeed, it is sad that, at the crucial point, we have only Diodorus to inform us. If we had an account corresponding (even) to Thucydides viii, despite that author's obvious lack of interest in Persian affairs, it might tell us a great deal about Achaemenid administration and about Persian administrative prosopography in the western provinces. It is interesting, at least, and on reflection not surprising, to see the satrap of Syria—one of the most powerful figures in the kingdom, and one of the closest to the King—concerned in the fighting and in the negotiations leading to the peace. To complete the list, we must at least add the satraps of Asia Minor: their participation in a peace between Athens and the King is obviously necessary. Diodorus presumably omitted them because there had at this point been no fighting in their territory.

Having supplemented one gap in Diodorus' account, we must now (as I have indicated) also reject his implication that Callias did not go to Susa. (It is only an implication, since we are not positively told where he went.) After all that had gone before—the negotiations by Callias in Susa and, as I have tried to show, the actual conclusion of a peace, which was soon broken; the

<sup>55</sup> He cannot be fitted into the known stemma of the family with any approach to certainty. It is almost inconceivable that he should be identical with the Artabazus somewhat earlier (477) known to have been based on Dascyllium (Thuc. i 129.1: appointed there to negotiate with Pausanias), even though Lewis identifies

them without any discussion (*op. cit.* 52). That Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, was a senior commander in Xerxes' invasion, a man even then 'of much renown among the Persians' (Hdt. vii 66; viii 126), who led the remnants of the army in its hazardous retreat after Plataea.

Athenian disaster in Egypt; and now Cimon's renewed intervention both there and in Cyprus—after all of this, the conclusion of a new peace could not be a routine matter. If it was necessary for Callias to go to Susa on the earlier occasion, as Herodotus attests, it would be inescapable now. Indeed, as we have seen, this was the obvious reason for the choice of Callias, personally known to the King and quite possibly his *xenos*. The King would have to be convinced that, this time, Athens could be trusted. And it would not be easy. If a lasting peace was to be made (and we have seen that Pericles, no less than the King, now wanted this), Callias had to go to Susa. Moreover, it will become clear that the King himself had a vital role to play in any agreement that might be concluded, even though he could not be expected to swear to it along with the Athenians.

The chronology offered by Diodorus should be accepted. He put the peace under the archon of 449/8, and that fits in with other dates that we can work out. As a matter of fact, although Diodorus' chronology is notoriously unreliable in general, his record on peace treaties is good. He has the correct dates for the Thirty Years' Peace (xii 7), the Peace of Nicias (xii 74.5), the treaty of 404 (xiv 3.2) and the King's Peace (xiv 110); and these are only the outstanding examples. He must have taken particularly careful notes on peace treaties when collecting his data. The year may therefore be regarded as certain. The precise time within it, of course, will have to be worked out in other ways, and there has been much discussion on it, especially since the editors of *ATL* made it crucially relevant to their explanation of the 'missing tribute quota list', which, on their view, is the list for 449/8. I give my own reconstruction of the chronology in an appendix.<sup>56</sup>

Diodorus' confusion between the early and the final parts of the expedition leads him to put the actual conclusion of peace before the return of the Athenian expedition; once it is seen that the battle of Salamis belongs to the return voyage of the expedition, it is clear that this cannot be correct. Negotiations may have started in spring 449, but the conclusion of the peace must come after the return of the expedition. Since no new principles needed discussion, as this peace would be only the renewal of one already negotiated at an earlier time, we need not allow much time for Callias' actual negotiations with the King. But the question that cannot be answered is how long he had to wait until he could see the King. It is well known that over the summer the King went to his mountain palace at Ecbatana, and there is no record of any Greeks (or, for that matter, other embassies) as being taken to see him there. If Callias arrived in the summer, it is very likely that he would have to wait at Susa until the King returned, i.e. until some time in the autumn. I do not see how peace can have been formally concluded—in Susa, Athens, and at whatever points in between were concerned—until well into the next archon year: perhaps at the very end of 449, more probably early in 448. The ceremonies at Athens and in the satrapal capitals concerned can only have taken place after the King had been consulted and had played his own part (on which more below). Diodorus, of course, puts the whole of the negotiations (and much else) in 449/8. But as usual, he probably did not mean to mislead, but is following his practice of narrating a connected historical account under what he regards as the key event—here beyond any doubt the conclusion of peace. At any rate, by early 448 we may take it that all was complete.

The formal peace, as Diodorus implies, was concluded between the Athenians and the western satraps—we may now add, 'concerning the affairs of the King and of the Athenians and their allies'. It is fortunate, in a way, that in his concentration on the actual area of hostilities he omits the satraps of Asia Minor: at least we can supply them for ourselves, and no one is likely to doubt that they had to be included. Had he omitted the satrap of Syria (the great Megabyxus), we might have *guessed* that he was also included, but it could not have been proved—and it would have been bound to be denied, by less perspicacious scholars, without fear of refutation. As it is, we do have that vital information. We may take it that in the original peace, the satrap of

<sup>56</sup> See pp. 38–9.



Syria (whose fleet, presumably, was the one directly concerned in the action at the Eurymedon) had also been included. He, no less than the satraps of Asia Minor, is needed for the peace to make sense.

We have already seen that, as far as the structure of the peace is concerned, we must be guided by the information provided in Thucydides viii. Even though in Greek circles it would be described as a peace 'with the King' (as presumably the Spartan treaties were described as treaties with the King), the King cannot have formally taken part in an agreement that gave away many of his rights over his possessions. The outlines of the main territorial terms are well known and need not be rehearsed here.<sup>57</sup> The *Fahrtgrenzen*, as we have seen, were unilaterally accepted by the satraps concerned, in return for security from Athenian attacks on their territories; but apart from that, we are reduced to guessing. As in all cases where we have only literary sources on a treaty (although in this case we are fortunate in having literary sources that show remarkable agreement on what they mention), even quite important clauses are only hinted at, or not mentioned at all. A non-aggression clause, as we have seen, is to be expected, and should be accepted in the light of the actual events (and particularly of the supposed instances of aggression by both sides) that we have looked at. We have also seen that not all Greek cities in Asia, or even near the coasts of Asia, were freed. Thus the two Magnesias remained under the King. And it is in this connection that we incidentally have what I think perhaps the strongest argument for the existence of a formal peace.

We have seen (p. 2 above) that the first specific reference to a text that could be seen on a stele comes in Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, who invites his audience to compare this peace with the King's Peace recently concluded. In his own summary comparison (117 ff.), he picks out some terms for specific mention. One of those terms is that the Athenians 'assessed some of the tributes' paid to the King (τῶν φόρων ἐνίοις τάπτοντες). Ever since Wade-Gery (*ATL* iii 275) recanted an untenable earlier suggestion, this has been rightly understood to mean, not (of course) that the Athenians positively assessed any cities for the King, but that he agreed to leave the tribute of the Greek cities over which he retained control unchanged, presumably at the level set by Artaphernes.<sup>58</sup> Now, it seems to me difficult to believe that those cities were not actually named on the stele, for their protection. But they must at least have been listed as a class, like (before the actual list of names) those which the Peace of Nicias protected from increase in tribute after they were surrendered by Sparta to the Athenians (Thuc. v 18.5—mentioning the tribute of Aristides, even though it is unlikely that all those particular cities, or perhaps any of them, were assessed by Aristides). At the very least, therefore, we must supply some such phrase as 'the Greek cities paying tribute to the King'.<sup>59</sup>

Thus Isocrates' ἐνίοις, intended to boast of Athens' past power, coyly disguises a list, or at the very least a definition, of Greek cities that remained subject to the King in full form. It must

<sup>57</sup> See, e.g., Thompson (n. 37) 171. It should be added, however, that Aristodemus is the one who (oddly enough) seems to have recorded (from Ephorus, as we have suggested) the most precise version of the geographical points named. He gives the *Fahrtgrenze* 'for the Persians' (a phrase which is also precise and, as we have seen, correct—though often ignored by scholars) as the Cyanaeae, the Nessus river, Phaselis in Pamphylia and the Chelidonian Islands. No one else mentions the Nessus, or any river that can reasonably be got out of it by emendation, anywhere near the mouth of the Bosphorus, as it presumably has to be (since the places are neatly divided into two pairs: one in the north and one in the south—again a point missed by distinguished scholars, who wanted to misidentify the Cyanaeae). Thus no one could have made it up, even though we (not at all surprisingly) cannot identify it. (It is certainly not the well-known river in Thrace, but homonymity in rivers is common.) The precision of

Aristodemus at this point must be borne in mind in any discussion of the Peace of 449/8.

<sup>58</sup> If it was still necessary to give a formal refutation of Gomme's ill-starred attempt to deny the plain meaning of Isocrates, that task was elaborately and definitively performed by Thompson (n. 37) 173.

<sup>59</sup> The definition of what was a Greek city would not be easy, since many cities were of mixed population. It might depend on who did the judging, and for what purpose. Thus the 'Greekness' of Aspendus, often doubted by scholars (especially in connection with Alexander the Great's treatment of it), has been strikingly confirmed, from a friendly point of view, by the Argive decree honouring the Aspendians as συγγε-νεῖς, published by R. S. Stroud in *Hesperia* liii (1984) 193–216 (text at p. 195) and dated by him around 300 BC. Hence a precise enumeration seems a preferable hypothesis.

surely be asked: if the stele seen by Isocrates and others in the fourth century was an invention for the glory of Athens, as the opponents of authenticity would have it, why should such a clause be on it? Why should a putative forger admit that there were Greek cities which the Athenians did not succeed in 'liberating', but for which they at most extracted a special privilege? The contrast with the Spartans, who had left all the Greek cities of Asia in the King's power, would surely have demanded a formal statement that *all* the Greek cities of Asia were to be free. It is a question which the opponents of authenticity have never properly addressed. Isocrates, however, was faced with real facts: he had to make the best of an uncomfortable truth, that Athens had by no means succeeded in liberating all the Greek cities, as anyone who could read could see. He decided to gloss over the uncomfortable fact and stress its glorious aspect, with convenient vagueness of actual definition. It is perhaps no wonder that that clause is ignored by those who later referred to the peace.

We must presume that this was again a unilateral concession: it is clear enough from later events that Athens did not feel bound not to increase the tribute of her allies in Asia. Whether autonomy was actually stipulated for the Greek cities we do not know; but it is quite likely, since we know that the King, in principle, was not opposed to granting autonomy to the Greek cities under his rule.<sup>60</sup> There is a further reason for believing that autonomy may have been provided for, even though Isocrates, for reasons that should be obvious, could not make any reference to this. We have already seen that the Peace of Nicias contained a provision combining subjection to Athens with a guarantee of autonomy and an unchanged tribute: indeed, this tribute is called the tribute of Aristides, even though the term was not strictly appropriate. It might be noted that the Peace of Nicias was sworn only a few years after the renewal of the peace with the King by the embassy of Epilycus. But we should probably go further back. As we have pointed out, an autonomy clause of some kind, and covering at least some cities paying tribute to Athens, must be presumed to have been included in the Thirty Years' Peace (see p. 21 above, with n. 38). *That* peace, however, not only followed within a few years upon the (renewed) Peace of Callias with the Persians, but it was itself negotiated by the same Callias. It is not extravagant to suggest that a diplomatic category that he had developed (perhaps first many years earlier) in negotiations with the King—Greek cities that were autonomous and tribute-paying, on set terms—was now transferred to treaties between Greek states. The tribute of Aristides is widely agreed to have been identical (in cities that had been under the King) with the tribute that followed the survey by Artaphernes (see, e.g., Meiggs, *Ath. Emp.* 61). The Peace of Callias (it may be suggested) therefore has a hitherto unrecognised importance in the development of Greek diplomacy, and in the events that led to the Peloponnesian War.

The report that the satraps agreed to withdraw their forces beyond a day's ride, or three days' march, from the coast of Asia Minor (the original distance was presumably expressed in parasangs and had to be translated into Greek) presents us with another example of the inaccuracy of literary tradition. It cannot be correct as it stands, for much of the coast of Asia Minor, e.g. most of the north coast and the south coast east of Phaselis, in no way concerned the Athenians. Even within the small western strip that did, there were (as we have seen) Persian-held cities whose territory must have stretched to within those limits. The most reasonable reconstruction of this clause is to suppose that it was expressed in terms of the territory of Athenian allies, which, along the western coastline in particular, would in many cases add up to a continuous stretch of coastline, and would extend a fair part of the stipulated distance into the interior. Whether this clause established a 'neutral zone', as the editors of *ATL* thought (i.e., whether, unlike the *Fahrtgrenze*, the obligation was reciprocal), we cannot tell. It is quite likely that in this case the Athenians had to concede it, since the territory of some important Persian cities (e.g. Sardis itself) might be within that zone. On the other hand, since that territory was secured by the non-aggression clause, it is possible that here too the Athenians did not give a reciprocal assurance. The agreement not to cross the Halys, which Isocrates mentions (though not in 380), was correctly explained long ago and should be

<sup>60</sup> See Xen. *Hell.* iii 4.25, which should have been true at an earlier time. Thompson (*op. cit.*) gives various reasons that might have prompted Isocrates to omit any

reference to autonomy, but not the obvious and striking one (as I think it) implied in the text above.

accepted.<sup>61</sup> Wade-Gery got the main point right: the royal army was not to enter Asia Minor again. Of course, this did not mean (as he thought) that only 'token forces' were permitted there: there is no mention, even in our oratorical sources, of any limit on the satrapal forces, and we know that the satraps continued to use both native levies and mercenaries (including Greeks) as they saw fit. The purpose of this clause must have been to ensure that there would be no preparations for an invasion of Europe: historically, that was the only purpose for which a royal army had ever appeared in Asia Minor since the completion of the Persian conquest, and the only conceivable purpose for which it would be needed. If the King ever broke that undertaking, the breach would be spectacular and significant. No one could fail to know, and there would be adequate time to make preparations. We may also accept the modern conjecture that the walls of the cities in Asia Minor were demolished, since we have ample evidence, often rehearsed, that both the King and Athens preferred to have their subject cities unwallled. There would be no opposition to this from either side, and the Athenians might claim that it was a necessary concession to the King.

We can at once see that the clauses we ought to accept were largely, but not entirely, within the competence of the satraps. The clause about the royal army involved the King. The most the satraps could have undertaken would be not to *ask* for a royal army; but that would be far from adequate protection. And if this clause might still be explained away, we have no such option for the clause involving the exemption of the allies of Athens from paying tribute to Persia (that they had to pay to both Persia and Athens is an idea that no longer needs refutation) and, if we assume its existence, for the autonomy clause; nor, most strikingly, for the guarantee of a fixed tribute to be paid to the King by the Greek cities over which he retained control.

That the King remitted the tribute of the cities that had to pay to Athens, and that we have evidence for this when, in the winter of 412/1, Thucydides records (viii 5.5) that he had 'recently demanded that Tissaphernes pay him the tribute of the Greek cities in his satrapy, which he had not paid because the Athenians had prevented its collection'—this has long been recognised by all who are not blindly opposed to the authenticity of the Peace of Callias. (We note again, incidentally, the easy rhetorical misrepresentation in a literary source, for the Athenians had obviously not prevented the tribute of *all* the Greek cities in his satrapy from being collected.) Meister (p. 14) claims that this *proves* ('beweist') that the King had never abandoned his claim to that tribute—hence it is another argument against the existence of a peace. But it cannot prove anything of the sort. As we are told by Andocides (iii 29 f.), though characteristically not by Thucydides, the Athenians had, not long before (though the exact date is not clear), broken the peace so carefully negotiated by his uncle by supporting the revolt of Amorges, which made the King angry. Most scholars have rightly concluded that the demand of tribute was the King's reaction to that provocation, for support for that rebellion could almost certainly not be justified by any interpretation of the terms of the peace—and if it could (in the Athenian view), then the peace was not worth maintaining. The Athenians had finally done what Pericles, as we saw Plutarch stresses, had long restrained them from doing.<sup>62</sup> We do not need an abacus to work out that, had the King (as Meister supposes) demanded that Tissaphernes pay him all the tribute of the cities that had been paying to Athens ever since 448 (if not earlier), Tissaphernes would have had no recourse but either to make his escape or to rebel. Even a satrap's purse was not bottomless. The debt he in fact owed, perhaps slightly backdated, was manageable; indeed, Tissaphernes presumably had to pay it, since he remained uncontestedly in office; and he clearly had enough money left over to support a Spartan force before long. By his standards, the

<sup>61</sup> See, in general, Andrewes, *Historia* x (1961) 15 ff.; Meiggs, *Ath. Emp.* 148 ff. The explanation is still sometimes missed; thus Thompson (*op. cit.* 171) calls this item a 'wild exaggeration'. Yet note that it is mentioned by Isocrates both in the *Areopagiticus* (80) in the 350s and, near the end of his life, in the *Panathenaicus* (59). Presumably no one, during this time, had consulted the stele and contradicted him.

<sup>62</sup> See Andrewes in Gomme *et al.*, *HCT* v 16 ff., with recent bibliography. Andrewes convincingly refutes some attempts at alternative explanations—advanced (I suspect) chiefly in an attempt to circumvent the obvious implication of the correct interpretation in confirming the authenticity of a peace treaty between Athens and the Persians.

amount cannot have been large. What made action urgent was the prospect for the future: if he could not collect and had to go on paying year after year, that would be a constant drain on his fortune, and that had to be prevented, even at some immediate cost.<sup>63</sup> It would therefore be simply a sound investment for him to pay a small Spartan mercenary force for a short time (as he no doubt thought) in order to drive the Athenians out. The King's demand meant that the Peace no longer had to be observed.

This little item of information, fortuitously supplemented by Andocides, helps to tie together much that we have had to work out, with great effort, from scattered evidence, because of Thucydides' unhelpful silence as regards relations with the Persians. Indeed, but for the information provided by Andocides, we could not with real assurance have used even the casual remark about the King's demand for tribute which Thucydides tosses at us. As it is, we see the King's involvement in, and importance to, the making and the maintenance of the peace illuminated by this sudden flash. Unfortunately, we are left to deduce the precise nature of that involvement for ourselves. But the King's Peace provides the clue: the King's participation, in the formal sense, can only have consisted in an edict (or more than one) setting out, most probably, what he thought just. We might imagine an edict thinking it just that the allies of Athens should have the tribute paid to the King remitted, and one granting autonomy to all the Greek cities (and presumably a limitation of tribute to those which were not allies of Athens). It is harder to visualise an edict covering the promise not to send an army across the Halys line, and some Athenian 'interpretation' must be assumed in Isocrates' rendering. I suggest the King might state (e.g.) that the satraps of Asia Minor were to be solely responsible for defending their satrapies. Needless to say, such royal edicts were not the law of the Medes and Persians: they were revocable. But they were the best the Athenians could get. The word of the King, formally expressed, ultimately had to be trusted. In fact, the King stood at the centre of the whole process and of its preservation. It was he who had instructed the satraps to make peace, certainly in 449 and presumably also after Eurymedon, and it was he who would have to guarantee that the peace they had made would survive (as in fact it did) the death or removal of one of the satraps concerned. Presumably, royal edicts could also be formulated to endorse the terms of non-aggression and perhaps the *Fahrtgrenze*, with due praise for the Athenians as loyal friends of the King. As we saw, Andocides (iii 29) fortunately attests the existence of a 'friendship' clause, at least in the 'Peace of Epilycus', and there is no reason to regard it as a novelty.

We can see why a visit to Susa was essential, even though the King could not swear to the treaty and could not formally give up any of his possessions. Both the King and the Athenians had never before faced the problems caused by the incompatibility of the two systems, and the solution—whatever it was, in detail; but in outline no doubt as here deduced from the only relevant evidence we have—must be recognised as a major accomplishment on both sides. It attests the sophistication reached by Athenian diplomacy under Cimon's leadership, after only a decade or so as an imperial power, as well as by the Achaemenid Kings, despite their implied claim to universal rule. It is reasonable to assume that much of this structure was the work of Callias son of Hipponicus himself—the man who later renewed it after it had been shattered by irresponsible politicians, and who seems to have applied its lessons, in so far as they were applicable, in what may have been an almost equally masterly document (to judge by what little of it we can reconstruct): the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta, destined in its turn to be shattered by irresponsible politicians.

The way in which the King stood at the centre of the diplomatic construction was obviously beyond the understanding of the ordinary Athenian voter. It is not at all surprising that, as far as we can see, it was presented to him (and by him) in a conveniently simplified form. But Athenian politicians were probably well aware of it: hence the nervousness with which they

<sup>63</sup> I assume (as is generally assumed) that the satrap would be personally responsible for the tribute due to the King from his province, even though I do not know

of any positive evidence for this. It fits in with the Persian conception of government in terms of personal relations within a hierarchic system.

regarded any Spartan approach to the King<sup>64</sup> and their eagerness to establish contact with Artaxerxes' successor.

It is easy to see what the Athenians got out of the peace, and why Pericles was ultimately as eager as Cimon had been to accept it. The change in the vision of empire implied in his citizenship decree made peace imperative: Athens could not, in the long run, go on defending allies who were not unanimous in being willing to be defended; on the other hand, only peace enabled Pericles to intensify the process of exploitation which he regarded as the legitimate profit of empire.

As for the King, he had rid himself of Athenian harassment and aggression. He had gained security against Athenian interference in trouble-spots like Egypt and Cyprus, and security of commerce on the seas that was the foundation of the prosperity and the loyalty (and, not least, the tribute) of the Levant. But we have not yet clearly defined the price he had paid. The tribute of the Greek cities was a relatively minor sacrifice, in return for security in all the rest. But there is still an important formal point to be considered. We saw, when discussing the treaties in Thucydides viii, how difficult it was to arrive at a diplomatic formula, once the Spartans obstinately refused to recognise the King's sovereignty over all that he and his ancestors had ruled; and we saw how the formula finally arrived at explicitly guaranteed him Asia (with which, in fact, he would henceforth always be content) and allowed him to state the rest of his claims without explicit acknowledgment. If these difficulties are demonstrable in 411, it is inconceivable that the King could have allowed his satraps to make peace 'regarding the affairs of the King' a generation earlier in such a way that the renunciation of his sovereignty over most of the Greek cities of Asia was acknowledged; let alone that his own edicts that held the peace together could have indicated any such acknowledgment. Obviously, there must up to a point have been an evasive formulation, such as ultimately satisfied the two sides in 411. But the difficulty of arriving at it on that occasion, even for the limited purpose of collaboration for the common advantage in Asia, suggests that it had not been done in precisely the same way before, even though the Peace of Callias obviously supplied certain guide-lines. The bare statement that the Greek cities of Asia were to be autonomous and (if allies of Athens) exempt from tribute would have amounted to a renunciation of sovereignty which the King could not have allowed. Help may come from an interesting passage involving later negotiations.

In 411, Alcibiades pretended (so Thucydides tells us) to be negotiating with Athenian envoys in the name of the King, and on that basis the Athenians made various concessions. In fact (we are told), he wanted to drive them into breaking off negotiations, as he had no real influence with the satrap; so he finally produced a demand that they regarded as so intolerable that they indeed gave up. That demand was the stipulation that (to follow the only acceptable version of the text) the King should be allowed *παρὰπλεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γῆν* at any time, with a fleet of any size.<sup>65</sup> How was this related to the *Fahrtgrenze* of the Peace of Callias and Epilycus? As we have seen, this was unilateral. But what had the satraps (and perhaps the King by edict) actually promised? I would suggest that the wording had been exactly parallel: that the King's ships would *not* *παρὰπλεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γῆν*. We may compare viii 58.2 (treated pp. 29 f. above.) In other words, this clause, like the exemption from tribute for some and 'assessment' of it for others, and the autonomy clause, must all have recognised the King's continuing sovereignty by implication. He could not formally abdicate it. And the Athenians knew enough about diplomatic necessities to realise that, if they wanted peace, they could not have got it on any other terms. Whatever form of words was finally agreed to could be regarded as no more than a sop to the King's vanity. As we

<sup>64</sup> See, e.g., Thuc. ii 67 (*cf.* Hdt. vii 137); iv 50.

<sup>65</sup> Thuc. viii 56.4. For a defence of the reading of C (ἑαυτῶν) see M. S. Goldstein, *CSCA* vii (1974) 155 ff. Against, see the strong linguistic arguments in *HCT v ad loc.*, by Dover and Andrewes. They also point out the isolated sense that the reading of C would yield, as compared with the historical plausibility of the sense

yielded by the better-attested reading. We may note that the demands to which the Athenians were willing to submit had (as reported by Thucydides) concerned only the Ionian cities and the offshore islands: the better-attested reading fits in with these demands, but not with a request concerning Attica.

have seen, peace was very much wanted by Cimon and, after his change of policy, by Pericles. And the terms finally agreed upon could no doubt be presented as an acknowledgment of defeat by the King to a Greek public, and as concessions made because the King thought them 'just', as gifts to his new friends, to the King's subjects far from the Mediterranean coast. But we now begin to understand the opposition to the peace terms in Cimon's day, and above all the reluctance of our fifth-century sources, no doubt familiar with the precise terms, to mention them in historical works written for the glorification of Athens. The terms simply did not bear close scrutiny—and this should have been clear to anyone who is familiar with the structure and the ethos of the Achaemenid monarchy. When the King's Peace provided an opportunity to contrast the Athenian hegemony with the Spartan, the terms, surprisingly faithfully reinscribed (as we saw, concessions were clearly not deleted), but now used mainly by orators and rhetorical historians, could be presented as characteristic of a golden age of Greek superiority over the Barbarian.

It is time scholars stopped disputing the authenticity of the peace at excessive length and started discussing its cardinal importance both in the history of relations between the King and the Greeks and in the history of Athens and, in particular, of the development of Athenian and of Persian diplomacy. This article, which has necessarily been long enough in any case, has perhaps given some indications of the questions that might be pursued.<sup>66</sup>

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## APPENDIX

### CIMON'S CYPRIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE RENEWAL OF THE PEACE

The authors of *ATL* put Cimon's campaign in 450, as most other scholars had done, since the term of Cimon's ostracism, on any reasonable interpretation, would expire in 451. (For another view see n. 23 above, with my comments.) After his return, the expedition would still have to be prepared. Since the authors wanted tribute collection in the Athenian Empire to be cancelled for the year 449/8, and realised that this ought to require a previous announcement, so that the cities would not collect the sums due, they had to posit the conclusion of the peace in the first half of 449, contrary to Diodorus' date; moreover, this clearly did not allow enough time for the final fighting and the negotiations at Susa. Meiggs, who wanted to retain the cancellation of tribute in that year, tried to deal with the serious difficulties caused by the *ATL* chronology by moving the whole of the Cyprian expedition to 451 (first *HSCP* lxxvii [1963] 11 ff.). The wish again tended to be father to the thought: cf. *Ath. Emp.* 125: 'The advantages of dating Cimon's death in 451 are considerable.' But this merely substitutes an impossible rush in 451 for an impossible rush in 449, and it still fails to account for Diodorus' date.

<sup>66</sup> The views here collected have been presented, in various partial forms, in lectures given from Princeton to Perth and from Marburg to Melbourne, ever since I first advanced the basic outline at the University of California at Berkeley in 1975, to a large and helpful audience. As a result, I can no longer acknowledge the numerous individual suggestions which helped me in clarifying my ideas. In the particular form here submitted, however, the argument was first presented in a paper read to the Oxford Philological Society, and later at the Institute of Classical Studies in London, in the spring of 1985. The former occasion was followed, until late at night, by vigorous discussion, the impact of which will perhaps be recognised by some of those who contributed, although I suspect that neither they nor I

have ended up by changing our basic opinions. The article was drafted in the ideal environment of Oxford, which I owed to the kindness of St John's College and, in particular, to Nicholas Purcell. It forms part of the work done while I was on a leave partly supported by the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation. To those generous patrons, as well as to the unfailing courtesy of the staff of the Ashmolean Library, I owe gratitude that must at least be expressed, though it cannot be repaid. Last, but not least, I am grateful to the Editor of this Journal, who accepted a work that had become *ὑπερφυῆς μεγέθει*, ingeniously fitted it into his limited space, and put up uncomplainingly with my revisions of the typescript.

As usual, Thucydides is here no use for precise chronology, in view of the vagueness of his terminology. But some conclusions can be attempted. He tells us (i 112.1) that three clear years after the last fighting in Greece a truce was made for five years (he does not connect the truce with Cimon), and that Cimon then set out on the expedition. We can deduce some information regarding the expiry of that truce from another passage. When Megara, in 446, decided to rebel against Athenian control (i 114.1), it was some time after the beginning of the campaigning season, for Euboea had already rebelled and Pericles had crossed to regain it. At that time, Megara gained the support only of its Peloponnesian neighbours. It was only later in the season (i 114.2) that the full Peloponnesian army at last appeared, some time after Pericles had returned and was ready to face them. By then, at a conservative computation, it must have been midsummer. The only plausible reason for the delay in the invasion is the precise duration of the truce, which the Spartans clearly observed with their usual scrupulous precision regarding oaths, whereas the Corinthians and their neighbours were a little less scrupulous (as one might gather from the preliminaries of the Peloponnesian War), or perhaps did not consider themselves bound by the truce at all (*cf.* the Peace of Nicias). The truce, therefore, belongs to (at the earliest) midsummer 451; and not unreasonably, if indeed it was negotiated by Cimon after he had regained his full rights, earlier that same year. (His ostracism should belong to the eighth prytany of 462/1, the year of Ephialtes' reforms.) But by midsummer of 451 it would be far too late to mount a major campaign in Cyprus and Egypt, let alone for Cimon to die on it, as Meiggs would want. The campaign must be left in 450–49.

The chronology of the campaign itself is confused by Diodorus' conflation of minor fighting at the beginning with the great naval battle fought after Cimon's death, when the force was returning. (See Gomme, *HCT* i 330.) The Cimon myth tended to attract the victory to his lifetime, hence (since it was known that he died in Cyprus) to an early stage of the war. That the actual war lasted over the winter into 449 must be regarded as certain. Thuc. i 112.4 reports famine among the besiegers of Citium after Cimon's death, which suggests winter and difficulties over supplies. As often, text critics have been engaged on unnecessary emendation, here converting λιμοῦ into λοιμοῦ, and even suggesting that Cimon died of the 'pestilence' thus introduced. However, Thuc. plainly states that the famine came *after* Cimon's death (Κίμωνος δὲ ἀποθανόντος καὶ λιμοῦ γενομένου) and the whole of this speculation (for which Beloch seems to deserve the credit) should be abandoned. As it happens, the date of the battle of Cyprian Salamis can be disengaged: see E. Badian and J. Buckler, *RhM* N.F. cxiii (1975) 235 ff. It took place on Munichion 16, i.e. in the spring; and since the fleet was on its way home, in the spring of 449. It is possible that it could not return earlier in the year. Plut. *Thes.* 18 connects the procession of maidens to the Delphinion with the departure of Theseus on that date (Munichion 6), and the standard scholarly view, that major naval expeditions were not launched before that date (even though ships might in principle set sail after the Dionysia: Theophr. *Char.* 3.3) is quite likely to be correct, in view of the date of Munichion 10, for the departure of a fleet that was obviously regarded as needed as early as at all possible, in *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 1629, 170. (See F. Graf, *MH* xxxvi [1979] 6 f., with references for this view, which he opposes: I should like to thank my colleague Albert Henrichs for this reference.) We need not doubt that, after a disastrous winter, the fleet left Cyprus as early as possible, and the date of the battle and the standard view regarding the festival procession may be taken as supporting each other.

Peace can only have been negotiated after the return of the fleet, which confirms Diodorus' date of 449/8 for its conclusion. If one wishes, one may say that tribute was simply not collected in the spring of 448, after the allies had got it all ready for transportation. (Thus Eddy [n. 42] 241; though, as will be clear from much of the argument in my text, I cannot accept his further hypothesis that it was reinstated in the following year owing to concentrated Persian acts of blatant aggression in the year immediately following the peace.) But the problems of the 'missing quota list' and of the historicity of the 'Congress Decree' are probably not directly connected with the renewal of the Peace of Callias and in any case cannot be pursued here.